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ABSTRACT 
GOVERNMENT GRANTS, CROWDING OUT THEORY, AND AMERICAN 
BASED INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
BY 
 
KING ODHIAMBO OWALLA 
 
December 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James Alm 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 This dissertation extends the literature on the crowd-out theory1 to international 
nonprofits2 based in the United States. The dissertation measures the simultaneous impact 
of government grants on private contributions and fundraising activities of INGOs. 
Understanding the relationship of the major players (government, donors and nonprofit 
managers) in revenue collection of INGOs is important in understanding international 
charity and its implications. Six major sub-categories of international organizations have 
been identified for this research. These are based on a review of the literature on 
international organizations and those already coded as international according to the 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE).. The major sub-categories include (1) 
International, Foreign Affairs and National Security (ifans), (2) Promotion of 
International Understanding (piu), (3) International Development (id), (4) International 
                                                 
1 “Crowd-out” in this dissertation refers to the theoretical prediction of an inverse relationship between 
private and government contributions. The inverse relationship follows directly from the well-known 
incentives to “free ride” in the provision of a public good. 
 
2 An “international nonprofit” in this dissertation (henceforth referred to as International Non-governmental 
Organization, or INGO) is defined as a United States-based charitable organization whose primary purpose 
or mission is international in scope (i.e. they are referred to as organizations that support activities that are 
carried out beyond U.S. borders and whose beneficiaries are citizens of other countries). (Kerlin and Reid 
2005)  
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Peace and Security (ips), (5) International Human Rights (ihr), and (6) International, 
Foreign Affairs and National Security N.E.C. (ifansNEC). We employ a panel dataset of 
INGOs between the years 1998 and 2003 to test for the crowding-out effect of 
government grants on private contributions and fundraising activities. We have a total of 
2,169 INGOs in our data set and a total of 6,239 observations.  We find that fundraising 
expenses have a positive effect on private donations. Government grants have a negative 
effect on fundraising expenditures and a positive effect on private donations to INGOs. 
We infer from this that an increase in INGOs receipt of government grants may provide 
favorable information to potential donors about the reputation or the trustworthiness of an 
INGO.  Overall for all organizations, our results show evidence that government grants 
have a negative impact on private contributions to INGOs, although the size of the 
crowd-out is sensitive to both the construction of the panel and estimation technique and 
vary across subcategories. We also find that government grants have a negative impact on 
fundraising expenditures of these institutions.
   
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Researchers have dwelled extensively on the relationship between government 
grants and charitable contributions to nonprofits in an attempt to answer one of the 
fundamental policy questions in public finance, which is whether private donors who 
contribute to charities reduce or increase their contributions in response to increased 
government funding. The assumption of the crowding-out hypothesis has been that 
private givers, who are also taxpayers, view their tax payments as a substitute for their 
voluntary donations, reducing the net effectiveness of grants. Recently, it has been argued 
that government grants crowd out fundraising efforts rather than private contributions 
(Andreoni and Payne (2003). These authors argue that charitable organizations reduce 
their fundraising efforts when they receive a government grant and this indirectly causes 
a decrease in private contributions. Some papers find strong evidence that government 
grants to nonprofits cause significant reductions in fundraising efforts Kingma (1989). 
The lower levels of fundraising expenditures, in turn, reduce private contributions 
Andreoni and Payne (2003). This dissertation will jointly examine the crowding-out 
effect of government grants on private contributions and fund-raising activities of 
INGOs, respectively, in an attempt to explain the incomplete crowding-out observed in 
the literature more precisely. 
The simultaneous approach taken in this research follows that of Straub (2004) 
who states that private contributions, government grants, and fundraising efforts by 
nonprofits should be jointly determined, and cannot be understood in isolation.
2 
 
  
 
The conclusion of Okten and Weisbrod (2000) that there is little evidence of crowd-out 
after controlling for fundraising expenditures only encourages our approach to analyzing 
crowd-out in international nonprofit organizations.3 
Past research on crowding-out theory is incomplete and has provided mixed 
evidence on the relationship between government grants and private contributions. Most 
theoretical literature on the crowding-out hypothesis predicts a one-to-one relationship 
between government grants and private contributions (Andreoni 1988; Bernheim 1986; 
Roberts 1984; Warr 1982, 1983)4 while most econometric5 and experimental studies have 
found evidence of partial or no crowding-out (Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler 1995; 
Khanna and Sandler 2000; Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Payne 1998).  In an experimental 
study, Andreoni (1993) found evidence of partial crowding-out which was later 
confirmed in an experiment by Bolton and Katok (1998). On the other hand, Eckel, 
Grossman et al. (2005) found almost complete crowding out when they used an 
alternative experimental design and subjects were told that they were “taxed” for the 
government to be able to contribute to nonprofit organizations. A majority of the studies 
undertaken find evidence for some degree of crowding-out, although some studies find 
                                                 
3 Kingma (1989) finds significant evidence of crowd-out while not controlling for fundraising or 
distinguishing between lump sum and matching grants, and finds that fundraising expenditures have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability that a given listener contributes to public radio. 
 
4 In those models, the crowding-out is exactly one-for-one, since the altruistic individuals care only about 
the total funding to the charity and not the source of funding. 
 
5 Empirical evidence finds that crowding-out effect is less than one-for-one. Andreoni (1989) provides an 
explanation that individuals may derive private enjoyment from the act of giving (a “warm-glow”), 
independent of the level of the public good. 
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“crowding- in”6 of government grants. Khanna and Sandler (2000) find this for charities 
in the U.K., while Payne (2001) finds this for academic research institutions.7  
This dissertation examines the interaction of government grants, fundraising 
expenses and private contributions in revenue collection of INGOs, and seeks to 
determine whether government grants to INGOs simultaneously crowd out private 
donations and/or fundraising activities. As with the more recent empirical studies, we use 
data at the organizational level, which allows for the matching of charitable contributions 
to government grants given to the same organization. Our employment of panel data 
makes it possible to control for unobserved organizational heterogeneity and time-fixed 
effects.8 
 
Objective, Research Questions and Hypothesis of the Study 
 
 The main objective of the study is to determine the simultaneous effect of 
government grants on private contributions and fundraising activities of INGOs in the 
United States. In particular, the study seeks to capture the crowd-out/and or crowd-in 
effect of government grants on private contributions and fundraising activities of INGOs 
in 6 major sub-categories of the international nonprofit sub-sector in the United States. 
                                                 
6 “Crowding-in” in this dissertation refers to the theory that government grants can lead to higher private 
donations to nonprofits (i.e. that government grants are positively related to private donations). 
 
7 A summary of the literature review is found in Appendix B1. 
 
8 Problems using tax data, such as the omission of charitable donations for non-itemizers, still remain. For 
this reason, the data on charitable giving are not truly representative of the population; they under represent 
low-income individuals, certain minority groups, renters, and others who are less likely to itemize their 
deductions. Given the original purpose of the data, many demographic characteristics that affect 
preferences and behavior are not supplied on tax forms (i.e., factors such as education, race, and religion 
are not supplied). 
 
4 
 
  
We seek to analyze the following research questions: 
i) Do government grants to United States-based international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) crowd out private contributions to these institutions? 
  We hypothesize that there is a crowding-in effect of private contributions by 
government grants to INGOs. Our hypothesis of a crowd-in effect is based on 
conclusions by Rose-Ackerman (1982; 1987) who observes that government grants 
potentially crowd in charitable contributions because they can enhance the reputation of a 
charity in the view of donors. Since government officials monitor how INGOs operate, 
information asymmetries are usually limited and this enhances the willingness of 
potential donors to contribute. The grant monitoring function of government also may act 
like a price reducer in the minds of donors if they perceive that administration costs and 
fundraising activities will be kept in check. Government grants can also circumvent the 
standard neutrality theorem result that is behind crowding-out when the grants are 
financed in part from taxes on non-contributors. 
 Studies finding that charitable donors' lack of knowledge/concern about 
nonprofit's revenue from the government (Horne, Johnson, and VanSlyke 2005) further 
reinforce our hypothesis that private contributions do not change much in the case where 
INGOs accept government funds. This leads to crowding-in of private contributions by 
government grants. Other authors have found that government subsidies to nonprofits 
most often predict an increase in charitable giving, leading to a crowding-in effect 
(Khanna and Sandler 2000) 
ii) Do government grants to INGOs crowd out fund-raising activities of these 
institutions? 
5 
 
  
  We hypothesize that there is a negative correlation between the amount the 
government gives INGOs in the form of grants and the fundraising activities of these 
organizations. Recent increased pressure on INGOs to limit spending on administration 
and direct fundraising due mainly to scandals (InterAction (2004) leads us to believe that 
these institutions will logically reduce their fundraising activities in the presence of 
government grants and allocate more funds for programs and services. This suggests a 
negative relationship between government grants and fundraising expenses as found by 
Hager, Pollack et al.(2004). These authors conclude that INGOs may opt to keep 
administrative and fundraising costs excessively low to attract private charitable 
contributions. In this dissertation, we hypothesize that government grants help to meet the 
revenue requirements of INGOs, which leads to lower levels of fundraising efforts. 
Hence we see a negative relationship between government grants and fundraising 
expenses. 
 
Motivation 
 
Studies on crowding-out suggest that it is quite small, often near zero, and 
sometime even negative (Hungerman 2005; Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler 1995; Kingma 
1989; Manzoor and Straub 2005; Okten and Weisbrod 2000). All of this analysis, 
however, has not accounted for the simultaneous effect of government grants on private 
charitable contributions and fundraising activities of international nonprofits.9 This gap in 
the literature motivates this dissertation, which determines the simultaneous impact of 
                                                 
9 Andreoni and Payne (2003),  in factoring the actions of fundraisers in the crowd-out theory, ask what 
happens to a national nonprofit’s fundraising expenses when it gets a government grant. 
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government grants on private charitable contributions and fundraising expenses. We 
attempt to answer the question of whether both private donations and fundraising 
expenses reduce or increase, and by how much, in the presence of government grants. 
The INGO sub-sector has become a key player in American foreign policy10 
especially in disbursing international aid,11 and exists as a vehicle for charitable donors to 
apply their pooled resources toward a common goal outside the boundaries of the U.S. 
The financial relationship between INGOs and the U.S. government, though, has led 
INGOs’ autonomy, advocacy, and accountability to be called into question and their 
ability to attract charitable contributions12 jeopardized. The relationship between these 
three major actors (INGOs, government, and donors) has given rise to a number of 
different studies with the essential question being whether INGOs should maintain their 
distance from the government so as to retain their autonomy or whether they should work 
hand-in-hand with the government. According to Salomon, Sokolowski et al. (2003), 
INGOs receive 29 percent of their income through fees and charges, 35 percent from 
government and governmental organizations, and 36 percent through private 
contributions (which goes up to 58 percent when volunteer input is factored in as 
monetary equivalent). The need for understanding the effect governmental grants have on 
the other sources of revenue to answer some of the questions being asked in different 
studies further motivates the undertaking of this research. 
                                                 
10 This has come about for various reasons, including the failure of direct government-to-government 
foreign assistance, poverty reduction concerns, movements for economic development assistance and more 
recently with the quest to reduce the AIDS epidemic to manageable levels around the world. 
 
11 INGOs have recently been involved in assisting earthquake victims in Bam Iran, Indian Ocean Tsunami 
victims in Indonesia, helping in the two-decade-old conflict in Northern Uganda, assisting in the famine – 
ridden Darfur region in Sudan and helping in the war-induced starvation in the democratic Republic of 
Congo among other areas. 
 
12 This is the distinctive feature of these organizations and forms the basis of their existence. 
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The perceived conflict between private donors’ willingness to contribute to these 
organizations that are undertaking activities whose qualities cannot be judged ((1998) and 
their perceived negative reaction towards contributing to INGOs receiving government 
grants further motivates this dissertation. Understanding the relationship between INGOs, 
donors, and the government is also important, as these institutions need funds to operate 
and grow although different donors normally demand that their conflicting goals and 
agendas be met.13 This creates decision-making problems to nonprofit managers 
especially since the relationship between government grants and charitable contributions 
is still poorly understood. These major revenue sources place different sets of external 
demands on INGOs and the quest to shed some light on their relationship motivates this 
research. On one hand, multiple sources of revenue place contradictory demands on 
INGO managers. On the other hand, a lack of diversity in revenue sources creates its own 
management challenges.14 Understanding the relationship between the three actors is 
important as these institutions rely heavily on both government grants and private charity 
and also spend substantial amounts of money to lobby for both sources of revenue.15 
Brown and Mark (2001) point out that due to various concerns expressed by this sub-
sector when receiving government grants some of these institutions have distanced 
                                                 
13 The government normally is concerned for its population while safeguarding its own prerogatives, 
whereas donors and INGOs must justify their expenses to their respective constituencies. 
 
14 Too much reliance on government funding, for example, may subject an INGO to cash flow 
interruptions, bureaucratization, or distraction from the organization’s mission (Froelich 1999). 
 
15  Knowing the true impact of government grants on charitable contributions and fundraising expenses 
helps INGO managers to benefit by knowing the true cost/benefit of applying for government funds if part 
of that cost/benefit is hidden as future crowding-out and/or crowding-in of charitable giving. Understanding 
the relationship of different revenue sources also helps public managers to promote an optimal level of 
private giving and INGO output and to equip INGO managers to maximize their resources and ability to 
fulfill their missions. According to (Benefield and Edwards 1998; Froelich 1999; Kingma 1993), this also 
leads to INGO managers managing resource portfolios so as to maximize revenue. 
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themselves from accepting government grants (i.e., Oxfam) while according to Commins 
(1997), other well-funded organizations have maintained a critical distance while 
receiving government funding. 
This dissertation challenges some of the crowding-out literature on national 
nonprofits whose conclusions, although mixed, have a unanimous verdict that predicts 
that charitable donors’ response to government funding to nonprofits is to decrease their 
charitable giving. Brown (1997) argues that if government grants to a nonprofit act as a 
signal to donors about the number of people in need, then it can lead to an increase in 
private donations. Weisbrod (1998) concludes that government grants barely crowd out 
private donations after controlling for fundraising expenditures. The mixed evidence on 
the relationship between government grants and charitable contributions renders crowd-
out theory incomplete and in need of a new methodology to explain the crowd-out 
behavior observed in the literature. In addressing this gap in the literature, we jointly 
examine the crowding-out of government grants on private contributions and fundraising 
activities of INGOs. 
Extending the crowd-out theory16 to INGOs takes on special meaning in the 
current times given that these organizations have and continue to face important 
government grant disbursement policy shifts ever since the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. The policy change adopted by the U.S. government that any 
organization operating abroad and receiving government grants be considered “an arm of 
the U.S. government” has especially led to significant concerns in the INGO community 
in relation to their ability to raise funds from the private sector. The more these 
                                                 
16 Scholars using data from national nonprofits with little or no research dwelling on international 
nonprofits have undertaken crowd-out theory. 
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institutions are required to gather information that is extraneous to their charitable 
mission, the more they are perceived as agents of the U.S. government resulting in their 
impartiality being compromised and the possibility of private contributions being 
crowded out. This further compromises their role of channeling humanitarian and 
international aid of American citizens and the resources of government worldwide in this 
era of seemingly non-stop natural and man-made calamities of great magnitude.17 The 
effects of the policy shift motivate this dissertation, whose conclusions will benefit INGO 
managers as they will know the true cost or benefit of government funding to their 
institutions. This is especially true if part of the cost is hidden as future crowding-out of 
private donations or if part of the benefit is hidden future crowding-in of private 
donations. 
As a sub-sector, INGOs command enormous resources with many of them 
receiving significant levels of funding from the U.S. government to undertake large-scale 
programs around the world.18 According to Masendeke and Mugova (2006), large 
amounts of international aid from the U.S. government have increasingly been channeled 
to non-state actors such as INGOs, especially after some developing countries 
experienced a host of social problems when implementing the World Bank mandated 
structural adjustment programs in the mid 1980s to late 1990s and could not manage their 
economies efficiently. Weitzman et al. (2002) estimate that the nonprofit sector in the 
U.S. received over $664 billion in revenue. This accounted for more than six percent of 
                                                 
17 International media now provide nearly instantaneous information about international disasters and 
emergencies worldwide. 
18 INGOs make up between 2-4 percent of the revenue of the charitable nonprofit sector in the United 
States, according to Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006). They estimate that the INGO sector commanded US$ 
15.4, $15.9, and $17.7 billion in the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 respectively. 
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the total national income in 1997. Hammack (2001), on the other hand, estimates that the 
nonprofit sector generated nine percent of the gross domestic product in 2001. A 
slowdown in the U.S. economy19 resulting in government deficits (as happened in the 
mid- to-late 1980s) would lead to government cuts in funds to INGOs leading to cash 
flow interruptions, which would distract these organizations from their primary missions. 
Understanding the influence of government grants on charitable contributions is therefore 
important in understanding how INGOs can respond to loss of government grants and 
turn to other revenue sources to sustain their operations internationally.20 This important 
fact forms part of the reason for our undertaking this dissertation. 
According to the Urban Institute, over 40 percent of INGOs ran deficits in 2003 
despite the sub-sector having budgets that run in the hundreds of thousands and 
sometimes in the millions of dollars. Funding such large budgets demands significant 
fundraising efforts. This further motivates our dissertation as an attempt at a better 
understanding of the effect fundraising activities have on both private donations and 
government grants in allowing INGOs to maximize their resources and be able to put 
themselves in a position to fulfill their missions. Knowing the true cost or benefit of 
fundraising activities is beneficial to INGO managers and also introduces another 
explanation to account for the incomplete crowding out of private donations by 
government grants observed in the literature. Recent articles have found strong evidence 
that government grants to nonprofits cause significant reductions in fundraising efforts 
(Kingma (1989). 
                                                 
19 A similar slowing down of the economy happened in the 1970s and early 1980s, leading to cuts to 
nonprofits by the Reagan administration. 
 
20 Froelich (1999)  shows that too much dependence on government funding may subject a nonprofit to 
cash flow interruptions, bureaucratization, or distraction from the organization’s primary mission. 
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Finally, this dissertation is motivated by the fact that organizations that comprise 
the INGO sub-sector in the U.S. are diverse, making generalizations about the 
composition of revenue sources of the entire sub-sector of limited value. We therefore 
focus not only on the impact of government grants on charitable contributions and 
fundraising expenses for the INGO sub-sector as a whole, but also subdivide the sub-
sector into six major categories in an attempt to identify their widely varying revenue 
profiles and their effect on subsidy-charity relationships and subsidy-fundraising 
expenses relationships. 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 
Our work adds to previous studies in four main ways. First, by controlling for 
changes in the organizations’ fundraising behavior, we attempt to more accurately 
measure the crowd-out and/or crowd-in effect of government grants on private 
contributions. Second, instead of looking at only a few charities of a particular type, we 
use an extensive data set with over 2,000 INGOs in 6 main sub-categories. The extensive 
INGOs data set used is an improvement over previous studies that have looked at specific 
sub-categories only.21 Aggregating INGOs into 6 different sub-categories makes it 
possible to map out the differences in their behavior in the presence of government grants 
and how the grants affect private donors to a specific sub-category. Previous literature on 
crowding-out has tended to focus on a specific type of charity, so it is unclear whether 
their results apply to other sub-categories of nonprofits. Third, though numerous papers 
test whether government contributions crowd out private contributions, none can be 
                                                 
21 Check Appendix B for details. 
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found that either model or empirically test for crowding-out in the context of INGOs 
operating outside the boundaries of the United States. By looking at data on INGOs, we 
extend this literature into international policy. Fourth, we may help international charities 
in their fundraising campaigns and government in implementing their grant policies. 
Extension of the crowd-out literature to international organizations based in the United 
States allows comparison with national nonprofits in the United States as well. 
Disaggregating the INGO sub-sector into six major sub-categories also identifies the 
widely varying revenue profiles and the subsidy-charity/subsidy-fundraising activities 
relationship for different types of INGOs.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides 
background on INGOs. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on private donors’ motivations 
for giving to charities and the contribution of fundraising to the incomplete crowding-out 
theory. Chapter 4 offers a simple theoretical model showing how government grants 
impact fundraising decision and private donations to nonprofits. Chapter 5 presents the 
methodology and addresses the empirical specification, econometric issues, and 
description of the data set and explanation of variables. Chapter 6 presents and analyzes 
the empirical results. Chapter 7 offers policy implications of our empirical results and 
possible future research directions.
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CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND OF INGOs 
Historical Background of International Nonprofits 
 
The internationalization of the nonprofit sector is not an entirely recent 
phenomenon (Anheier and Cunningham 1994; Boli 2006) as it has grown for the past 150 
years from the formative era before the 1850s through 1910 to the interwar period 1914-
1918 (when only 31 international nonprofits were founded in Europe) and the postwar 
expansion 1939-1945 through the 1990s. The last few decades have seen an increase of 
the sub-sector with some of the international nonprofits growing into global actors 
(Anheier and Cunningham 1994; Clark and Themudo 2004; Lewis 2001; Lindenberg and 
Bryant 2001) operating in two or more countries and functioning with significant 
budgets, political influence, and responsibility. Increase in the popularity of international 
nonprofits is often given as one of the main reasons for their recent growth although the 
political environment since the 1980s has also favored these institutions as agents of 
development (Clarke (1998). Another factor for the growth of these institutions is the 
growing recognition of humanitarian needs in distant areas due mainly to the 
development of international media that now provide nearly immediate information about 
international disasters and emergencies worldwide (Lindenberg and Bryant (2001). Other 
supply-side elements that account for the development of international nonprofits include 
new openings in the political opportunities structure as well as important technological 
and social changes that have enabled these institutions to operate more freely and cheaply
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 across borders. A summary of the growth of international organizations from the 1900s 
to the year 2002 can be seen in Table 1 below. The table clearly shows a sharp increase 
of these institutions after World War II and another sharp escalation from the 1980s 
upwards. 
 
Table 1: Number of International Organizations 
 
 1909 1920 1931 1940 1951 1960 1972 1981 1991 2000 
Active 
Nonprofits 
(All Types) 
374 474 801 841 1,307 1,987 2,976 9,937 18,767 25,269 
Total 
International 
Nonprofits 
374 474 801 841 1,307 1,987 2,976 4,265 4,620 6,357 
Source: Union of International Associations (UIA), Yearbook of International 
Associations, various years. 
 
Figures for 1909-1972 in Table 1 are based on data using founding and 
dissolution dates from 1988-1989 and 1984-1985 Yearbooks. While any given Yearbook 
underestimates the number of international nonprofits operating in the years immediately 
prior to its publication, the UIA database remains the most reliable and comprehensive 
source of information available. Another way to appreciate the growth of these 
institutions is by considering the number of new international nonprofits founded in each 
decade as in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Distribution of International nonprofits in 8 Eras 
 
 Founded 
1851-60 
Founded 
1871-80 
Founded 
1881-90 
Founded 
1891-00 
Founded 
1901-10 
Founded 
1911-45 
Founded 
1946-88 
Intern. Nonprofits 
active in 1988 
Intern. 
Nonprofits 
5 22 38 95 261 854 3,673 4,449 
Source: Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Associations 
1985, 1988-1989, GIVING USA, 2005. 
 
The first great wave of international nonprofits occurred in-between 1850-1910, 
reaching its first peak of expansion by 1910. This period also saw a powerful wave of 
economic internationalism. The period 1911-1945 covered the turmoil of the world wars 
and the interwar periods. International nonprofits exploded between 1946 and 1988 with 
differentiation between global and regional organizations occurring Boli (1999), as 
shown in Table 2. 
The growth of international nonprofits over time and their important role in the 
development of third world nations has led to a number of different studies. Much of this 
literature has focused on two interrelated issues: the relationship between these 
organizations and the government and the relationship between them and private donors 
that fund them. One question that has arisen in these studies is whether international 
nonprofits should be competitors or partners with the government.22 Another question 
that has arisen in these studies is concern about dependency itself, and whether over-
reliance on donors (especially foreign donors) may affect the way they operate.23 
This dissertation takes a different approach to understanding the relationships 
between international nonprofits, donors, and the government, by examining two sources 
                                                 
22 The larger question is whether these institutions should maintain their distance from the government so 
as to retain their autonomy, or rather whether they should work hand-in-hand with government projects. 
 
23 There is a question of who these institutions are ultimately accountable to: a) the poor they service or b) 
the donors that fund their services. 
  
16
 
of revenue24 and the fundraising activities of INGOs. In the process we identify unique 
challenges to their existence and management. Revenue is more than just money and can 
represent the expectations and values of donors, the obligations of international 
nonprofits to government agencies, and the reliance of government on these institutions 
for implementing public policies. 
 
Definition of International Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
The term non-governmental organization is very broad and encompasses many 
different types of organizations. According to Judge (2000), the variety of international 
organizations that are nonprofit is too great to produce a satisfactory abstract definition. 
But the Union of International Associations (UIA) Yearbook of International 
Associations (YIA) 1961-2003 editors have come up with seven rules to identify an 
international nonprofit organization. The thrust of these rules is that these organizations 
must be functioning organizations with a high degree of autonomy, have a demonstrated 
international presence or orientation, and have ongoing activities oriented to reasonably 
well-specified goals. 
A few definitions put forth to describe these organizations include The Union of 
International Association’s concept of an international nonprofit as “Any organization 
that operates on a nonprofit basis and is not a creature of the state.” ECOSOC (2002) 
further refines this definition and states that INGOs can be defined as “Any international 
organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreement and includes 
organizations which accept members designated by government authorities, provided that 
                                                 
24 These sources are private contributions and government grants. 
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such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the 
organization.” A more elaborate statement offered by the UN Department of Public 
Information (2004) defines international nonprofits as “a not-for-profit, voluntary 
citizen’s group, which is organized on an international level to address issues in support 
of the public good. The institutions should be able to encourage political participation of 
civil society stakeholders at the community level internationally, provide analysis and 
expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement 
international agreements.” 
The definition of international nonprofits adopted here resembles those of 
(Bradshaw and Schafer 2000; Greensmith 2001; MacDonald 1994), who define a 
nonprofit operating internationally as “a nonprofit organization based in a developed 
country which operates in developing countries” stressing the importance of northern 
resources in the flow of international aid to developing countries. In this dissertation, we 
limit our definition to charitable tax-exempt organizations in the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit Database (NCCS). We also do not 
limit the beneficiaries of these institutions to developing countries. We adopt  Kerlin and 
Reid’s (2006) definition of the international nonprofit sub-sector (referred to here as 
International Non-governmental Organization, or INGO) as a United States-based 
charitable organization whose primary purpose or mission is international in scope.  
 
Case for Study of INGOs 
 
Focus on activities undertaken by U.S.- based international non-governmental 
organizations is at an all time high with technology, media and transportation 
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increasingly turning the world into a global village and forcing these organizations to 
respond to one crisis after another (i.e., increase in chronic hunger spots, doubling of 
natural disasters, dealing with the doubling of food aid prices, etc). These organizations 
have been enabled by rising trends in charitable giving (2002-2005), allowing these 
institutions to serve as vehicles for charitable donors to pool their resources toward a 
common goal. The ability to attract charitable contributions is a distinctive feature of 
these organizations, with private donations coming from individuals, charitable 
foundations, corporations, and bequests. 
 
Figure 1: Giving by Source, In Billions of Inflation-adjusted Dollars 
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Figure 2: Giving by Source, In Billions of Current Dollars 
 Source: Giving USA 2005. 
 
 
 As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, individual donors dominate private charitable 
donations, although all sources of private charitable revenue are significant. Using data 
from GIVING USA (2006), we show the trend of total charitable contributions to all 
nonprofits in the United States for the past 40 years.25 The trend for charitable 
contributions for INGOs is similar to the one for total charitable contributions to 
nonprofits in America, in the range of 2-4 percent of the total charitable contributions.26  
Figure 1 and 2 also show that total charitable giving has risen from approximately 
U.S. $11 billion in the early 1960s to over U.S. $248.52 billion in 2004 with individuals 
accounting for over 75 percent of the total contributions. Individual giving rose from U.S. 
$11.19 billion for inflation-adjusted dollars in 1964 to approximately U.S. $187.92 
                                                 
25 We show both inflation-adjusted and current dollar trends. 
 
26 This is based on calculations by Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006). 
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billion in 2004. While individual giving remains the lion’s share of total giving, it has 
declined as a percentage of the total over time. The figures above show that corporate 
giving is consistently the lowest share of the total while foundation giving has increased 
over time. Charitable bequests have been fairly stable as a share of total giving over time. 
Other sources of income to these institutions are from government grants, fees for 
services, dues, and rental of space and/or equipment. Government grants are the second 
largest source of funding for INGOs although they account only for about a fifth of 
INGOs revenue. According to Garrett and Rhine (2007), real federal government 
expenditures per capita to nonprofits in the United States were approximately $3,326 in 
1996 and $ 7,116 in 2004, reflecting an average annual increase of 2.0 percent which 
almost paralled charitable giving during this period.27 Forman and Stoddard (1996) show 
a clear bias in government funding towards larger INGOs and to certain INGO activities. 
Table 3 below shows government grants to INGOs in a 3-year period. 
 
Table 3: INGOs with Government grants, by amounts and percentages of grants 
 
 YEAR 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
INGOs with government grants 171 195 203 202 194 223
Government grants to INGOs (in millions) 256 285 301 305 304 328
Government grants as a percent of total INGO revenue 10.18 10.26 10.04 9.67 9.43 9.53
Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit Database 
(1998-2003) 
 
Table3 shows that an average of 10 percent of aggregate INGO revenue came 
                                                 
27 Based on Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006), government expenditures to INGOs will account for 2 percent 
of the expenditures per capita for the years 1965-2004. 
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from government grants for the years 1998-2003. The data show an increase in 
government dollars between the years 2001 to 2003 – from $305 million in 2001 to $328 
in 2003. This is due to a shift in the federal policy to increase foreign assistance after 
September 11. 
 The steady growth in private contributions and government grants is a motivation 
for us to pursue economic research on the question of whether private donors that 
contribute to charities reduce or increase their contributions in response to increased 
government funding for INGOs. We also will address whether INGOs reduce or increase 
their efforts in response to increased government funding for these institutions. 
 
Characteristics of INGOs 
  
Data from the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable 
Statistics/Guidestar database28 will be the basis for our summary of the major 
characteristics of INGOs. INGOs with annual revenue over $25, 000 and who work in the 
international arena have averaged about 5,600 institutions between 1998 and 2003 and 
make up 2 percent of all nonprofit organizations and 2 percent of the revenue of the 
charitable nonprofit sector in the United States.29 The number of INGOs has been 
increasing over time. Although the numbers of international development and assistance 
organizations (id) have registered the strongest growth, the mix of these organizations has 
grown younger with newer organizations sprouting up in areas like democracy, civil 
                                                 
28 Data consist of information that 501(c)(3) organizations, with $25,000 or more in annual revenue, have 
filed on Forms 990 with the Internal Revenue Service. 
 
29 See Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006). 
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society-building, the environment, and human rights. Analysis of the INGO sector by 
Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006) reveals that over 75 percent of these organizations are 
considered small organizations with less than $500,000 in revenue. The large proportion 
of small nonprofits in the United States is important as grant makers consider size when 
giving grants (government grants make up approximately 10 percent of the revenue for 
the sector).30 Charitable contributions31 still remain the most significant source of 
funding for INGOs (averaging between 60 – 65 percent of total revenue in the sector) 
despite larger organizations receiving sizable amounts of government funding. 
 
Revenue Sources 
 
The INGO sub-sector, just like the nonprofit sector in general in the U.S., has 
consistently and significantly relied on government for funding although government 
funding is still limited to a relatively small percentage of INGOs and contributes about 
one fifth of the overall revenue to the sub-sector Anheir (2005). Conventional wisdom, 
backed by studies of nonprofits (Chang and Tuckman 1991; Hager, Pollack, and Wing 
2004; J.S.Greenelee and Trussel 2000), suggests that a diverse portfolio of funding 
sources provides flexibility to organizations through periods of instability when the tastes 
and preferences of donors change or an economic downturn reduces charitable 
contributions or government funding. Heavy reliance on any one source of funding may 
jeopardize organizations in the event of a financial shock.  
                                                 
30 Forman and Stoddard (1996)  confirm this in their analysis of more than 400 organizations registered 
with USAID in 1999. 
 
31 See again Figures 1 and 2. 
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An analysis of the mix of revenue sources received by INGOs provides insights 
into their partnerships with government. Understanding the composition and distribution 
of revenue in the INGO sub-sector is key to understanding the existence of these 
institutions and the challenges of the INGOs management. Table 4 shows the mix of 
revenue sources in the INGO sub-sector. 
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Table 4: Sources of Revenue (in Millions), by category and year 
 
 1998 
 Private Contribution Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 194 33 103 330 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 352 69 270 691 
International Development 541 92 156 789 
International  Peace & Security 130 17 70 217 
International Human Rights 81 13 26 120 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 258 32 78 368 
Total Revenue 1556 256 703 2515 
 1999 
 Private Contributions Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 209 36 119 364 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 373 74 287 734 
International Development 601 101 176 878 
International  Peace & Security 136 22 80 238 
International Human Rights 78 15 27 120 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 310 37 97 444 
Total Revenue 1707 285 786 2778 
 2000 
 Private Contributions Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 213 41 119 373 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 397 79 294 770 
International Development 614 105 184 903 
International  Peace & Security 147 23 78 248 
International Human Rights 82 14 26 122 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 432 39 112 583 
Total Revenue 1885 301 813 2999 
 2001 
 Private Contributions Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 217 36 123 376 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 395 72 282 749 
International Development 645 111 186 942 
International  Peace & Security 140 23 77 240 
International Human Rights 88 16 31 135 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 527 47 135 709 
Total Revenue 2012 305 834 3151 
 2002 
 Private Contributions Govern. Grants Prog. Service Revenue Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 226 42 125 393 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 393 68 278 739 
International Development 678 104 180 962 
International  Peace & Security 151 26 79 256 
International Human Rights 95 14 29 138 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 539 50 144 733 
Total Revenue 2082 304 835 3221 
 2003 
 Private Contributions Govern. Grants Prog. Service Revenue Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 243 42 121 406 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 403 75 287 765 
International Development 774 113 208 1095 
International  Peace & Security 152 28 85 265 
International Human Rights 94 19 29 142 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 560 51 152 763 
Total Revenue 2226 328 882 3436 
Source of Data: National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit Database 
(1998-2003) 
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Table 4 shows the composition and distribution of revenue in the INGO sub-
sector for the years 1998 to 2003. The summary describes how INGOs’ revenues are 
distributed among some of their funders. A summary of the sources of revenue in Table 4 
shows that despite government grants being a significant source of funding for INGOs, 
private contributions far out-paced government grants in all years. The effect of private 
contributions to INGOs can be compared with charitable donations in United States. 
While all sources of private donations are significant, by far the dominant source of 
giving is from individuals. According to GIVING USA (2003), individuals gave over 183 
billion dollars to charity, or 76 percent of the total dollars donated, while foundations 
which fall into second place were responsible for only 11.2 percent of all donations. 
Table 5 shows the source of revenue as percentage of total revenue for further 
comparisons of revenue sources to INGOs. 
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Table 5: Sources of Revenue as Percentage of Total revenue, by category and year 
 
 1998 
 Private 
Contributions 
Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 7.71 1.31 4.10 13.12 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 14.00 2.74 10.74 27.48 
International Development 21.51 3.66 6.20 31.37 
International  Peace & Security 5.17 0.68 2.78 8.63 
International Human Rights 3.22 0.52 1.03 4.77 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 10.26 1.27 3.10 14.63 
Total Revenue 61.87 10.18 27.95 100 
 1999 
 Private 
Contributions 
Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 7.52 1.30 4.28 13.10 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 13.43 2.66 10.33 26.42 
International Development 21.63 3.64 6.34 31.61 
International  Peace & Security 4.90 0.79 2.88 8.57 
International Human Rights 2.81 0.54 0.97 4.32 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 11.16 1.33 3.49 15.98 
Total Revenue 61.45 10.26 28.29 100 
 2000 
 Private 
Contributions 
Government 
Grants 
Program Service 
Revenue 
Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 7.10 1.37 3.97 12.44 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 13.24 2.63 9.80 25.68 
International Development 20.47 3.50 6.14 30.11 
International  Peace & Security 4.90 0.77 2.60 8.27 
International Human Rights 2.73 0.47 0.87 4.07 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 14.40 1.30 3.73 19.44 
Total Revenue 62.84 10.04 27.11 100 
 2001 
 Private Contrib. Govern. Grants Prog. Service Revenue Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 6.89 1.14 3.90 11.93 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 12.54 2.28 8.95 23.77 
International Development 20.47 3.52 5.90 29.90 
International  Peace & Security 4.44 0.73 2.44 7.62 
International Human Rights 2.79 0.51 0.98 4.28 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 16.72 1.49 4.28 22.50 
Total Revenue 63.85 9.67 26.45 100 
 2002 
 Private Contrib. Govern. Grants Prog. Service Revenue Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 7.02 1.30 3.88 12.20 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 12.20 2.11 8.63 22.94 
International Development 21.05 3.23 5.59 29.87 
International  Peace & Security 4.69 0.81 2.45 7.95 
International Human Rights 2.95 0.43 0.90 4.28 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 16.73 1.55 4.47 22.76 
Total Revenue 64.64 9.43 25.92 100 
 2003 
 Private Cont. Govern. Grants Prog. Service Revenue Total Revenue 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 7.07 1.22 3.52 11.82 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 11.73 2.18 8.35 22.26 
International Development 22.53 3.29 6.05 31.87 
International  Peace & Security 4.42 0.81 2.47 7.71 
International Human Rights 2.74 0.55 0.84 4.13 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 16.30 1.48 4.42 22.21 
Total Revenue 64.79 9.53 25.65 100 
Source of Data: National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit 
Database (1998-2003) 
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Government grants for all international organizations remain relatively stable 
from 1998 to 2000, but reduce from 9.67 percent in 2001 to approximately 9.53 percent 
in 2003. This decrease is contrary to expectations as we expected it to increase as a result 
of renewed emphasis by the U.S. government in using foreign assistance to support 
foreign policy objectives in the aftermath of 9/11. International development and 
assistance organizations (id) and promotion of international understanding organizations 
(piu) among the 6 sub-categories of international organizations in this research are the 
most likely partners with government. Between the years 1998 – 2003 these two sub-
categories got the highest percentage of their revenue from the government (between 3.66 
percent to 3.29 percent and 2.74 to 2.18 percent, respectively, for the id and piu sub-
categories). All 6 sub-categories show significant increases of government funding from 
the year 2001 and above (see Table 5). International organizations as a whole have not 
seen a substantial increase in grant revenue over the years under this research. This 
decrease goes contrary to the popular perception of the government striving to increase 
international aid programs to shore up unstable regions by dramatically increasing 
foreign assistance. 
 
Size 
 
This research adopts Kerlin and Reid’s (2003) measurement of the size of 
nonprofit organizations according to the total revenue an organization receives in a single 
year. Organizations are deemed to be small if they receive less than $500, 000 in annual 
revenue; medium if they receive between $500, 000 and $2 million, and large if they 
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receive over $2 million (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Number of INGOs, by category and Size 
 
 1998 
 Small < $ 50,000 Medium 
50000-$ 1,999,999 
Large 
$ 2 Million and Above 
Total 
INGOs 
 # % # % # % # % 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 140 9.06 48 3.10 23 1.49 211 13.65
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 322 20.83 67 4.33 0 0.00 389 25.16
International Development 379 24.51 89 5.76 0 0.00 368 30.27
International  Peace & Security 105 6.79 20 1.29 0 0.00 125 8.08
International Human Rights 55 3.56 17 1.10 0 0.00 72 4.66
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 187 12.10 56 3.62 38 2.46 281 18.18
Total INGOs 1188 76.84 297 19.21 61 3.95 1546 100 
 1999 
 Small < $ 50,000 Medium 
50000-$ 1,999,999 
Large 
$ 2 Million and Above 
Total 
INGOs 
 # % # % # % # % 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 151 8.57 50 2.84 30 1.70 231 12.11 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 345 19.59 81 4.60 0 0.00 426 24.19 
International Development 432 24.53 109 6.19 0 0.00 541 30.72 
International  Peace & Security 116 6.59 25 1.42 0 0.00 141 8.01 
International Human Rights 58 3.29 12 0.68 0 0.00 70 3.97 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 247 14.03 67 3.80 38 2.16 314 19.99 
Total INGOs 1349 76.60 344 19.53 68 3.86 1761 99.99 
 2000 
 Small < $ 50,000 Medium 
50000-$ 1,999,999 
Large 
$ 2 Million and Above 
Total 
INGOs 
 # % # % # % # % 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 143 7.63 54 2.88 33 1.76 197 12.27 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 354 18.88 86 4.59 0 0.00 440 23.47 
International Development 417 22.24 109 5.81 0 0.00 526 28.05 
International  Peace & Security 117 6.24 24 1.28 0 0.00 141 7.52 
International Human Rights 50 2.67 22 1.17 0 0.00 72 3.84 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 338 18.03  78 4.16  50 2.67  466 24.86 
Total INGOs 1419 75.68 373 19.89 83 4.43 1875 100 
 2001 
 Small < $ 50,000 Medium 
50000-$ 1,999,999 
Large 
$ 2 Million and Above 
Total 
INGOs 
 # % # % # % # % 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 151 7.50 48 2.38 37 1.84 236 11.72 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 346 17.18 86 4.27 0 0.00 432 21.45 
International Development 445 22.10 120 5.96 0 0.00 565 28.06 
International  Peace & Security 111 5.51 26 1.29 0 0.00 137 6.80 
International Human Rights 60 2.98 17 0.84 0 0.00 77 3.82 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 420 20.85 100 4.97 47 2.33 567 25.82 
Total INGOs 1533 76.12 397 19.71 84 4.17 2014 100 
 2002 
 Small < $ 50,000 Medium 
50000-$ 1,999,999 
Large 
$ 2 Million and Above 
Total 
INGOs 
 # % # % # % # % 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 163 7.86 53 2.56 33 1.59 249 12.01 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 335 16.16 88 4.25 0 0.00 423 20.41 
International Development 494 23.83 105 5.07 0 0.00 599 28.90 
International  Peace & Security 114 5.50 29 1.40 0 0.00 143 6.90 
International Human Rights 59 2.85 24 1.16 0 0.00 83 4.01 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 433 20.89 94 4.53 49 2.36 576 27.78 
Total INGOs 1598 77.07 393 18.96 82 3.96 2073 99.99 
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2003 
 Small < $ 50,000 Medium 
50000-$ 1,999,999 
Large 
$ 2 Million and Above 
Total 
INGOs 
 # % # % # % # % 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 171 7.69 55 2.47 34 1.53 260 10.16 
Promotion of Inter. Underst. 357 16.06 82 3.69 0 0.00 439 19.75 
International Development 579 26.05 123 5.53 0 0.00 702 31.58 
International  Peace & Security 119 5.35 28 1.26 0 0.00 147 6.61 
International Human Rights 59 2.65 19 0.85 0 0.00 78 3.50 
Inter. Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec.NEC 446 20.06 97 4.36 54 2.43 543 24.42 
Total INGOs 1731 77.87 404 18.17 88 3.96 2223 100 
Source of Data: National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit 
Database (1998-2003) 
 
Table 6 shows that the INGO sector is dominated by small organizations (over 75 
percent of them are small organizations) with revenue less than $500,000. Medium 
organizations are about 20 percent of all INGOs while large organizations only make up 
4 percent of the INGO sub-sector.  Analysis of Table 6 shows that organizational size is a 
factor in government grant making as a majority of the small organizations are smaller in 
size but receive the lion’s share of grants. This fact suggests that governmental funding of 
organizations leans towards smaller organizations. 
 
Age 
 
The age of each organization has been calculated using the “rule date” on which 
the IRS recognized the organizations as a charitable, tax-exempt entity, following Kerlin 
and Reid (2005). Analysis of Table 7 indicates that international understanding and 
international affairs organizations are generally older, while development and assistance 
organizations are on average younger. The international affairs education category 
though has older organizations.  
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Table 7: Average and Median Age of International Organizations by Subcategories in the 
year 2003 
 
 Average Age (Years) Median 
Age 
(Years) 
International Development and Assistance 
General 10 7 
Agricultural Development 12 9 
Economic Development 8 7 
International Relief 10 6 
Educational Development 12 6 
Health Development 10 6 
Science and Technology Development 7 5 
Democracy and Civil Society Development 9 6 
Environment, Population and Sustainability 11 7 
Human Rights, Migration, and Refugees 12 9 
Development and Assistance Subtotal 10 7 
   
International Understanding 
General 16 12 
International Cultural Exchange 10 7 
International Academic and Student Exchange 14 10 
International Exchange N.E.C. 17 12 
Source: Adopted from Kerlin and Reid (2006) “The International Charitable Nonprofit 
Sub-sector in the United States.” National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar 
National Nonprofit database. 
 
 
World Regions of Operations 
 
 Table 8 shows that INGOs in Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, 
and East Europe and Central Asia are relatively prosperous compared to Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South and East and the Pacific regions. In addition, a relatively small number 
of development and assistance organizations were dedicated to sub-Saharan Africa 
INGOs increased their presence in terms of global operations in the Middle East 
especially after 2001, most likely because of the “war on terrorism” in U.S. foreign 
policy after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
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Table 8: Different Types of (Ifans) in Specific World Regions, In Percentages 
 Central Europe 
& Central Asia 
Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
The Middle 
East & North 
Africa 
South & East 
Asia & the 
Pacific 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Western Europe, 
Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan 
Global 
(More than 
one Region) 
% 
Tota
l 
General (n=699) 10 29 9 15 9 2 26 100 
Agriculture (n=59) 10 19 5 3 8 2 53 100 
Economic (n=168) 15 16 3 9 7 3 46 99 
International Relief 
(n=1,025) 
17 27 6 14 8 1 27 100 
Education (n=356) 6 17 26 17 10 12 12 100 
Health (n=581) 6 27 6 14 10 2 34 99 
Science and Technology 
(n=41) 
5 7 10 12 7 12 46 99 
Democracy and Civil 
Society (n=76) 
32 16 3 11 4 1 34 101 
Environment, Population, 
and Sustainability (n=169) 
5 18 1 8 8 2 59 101 
Human Rights, Migration, 
and Refugees (n=185) 
11 9 12 17 7 2 41 99 
All Development and 
Assistance (n=3,359) 
12 24 8 14 9 3 31 101 
General (n=796) 10 29 9 16 11 2 25 21 
Agriculture (n=62) 10 19 5 5 8 2 52 2 
Economic (n=177) 15 15 3 11 8 3 46 5 
International Relief 
(n=1,117) 
16 27 5 15 9 1 27 30 
Education (n=423) 6 18 24 18 12 11 11 11 
Health (n=655) 7 28 6 14 11 2 32 18 
Science and Technology 
(n=45) 
4 9 9 11 13 11 42 1 
Democracy and Civil 
Society (n=84) 
30 17 4 11 4 1 35 2 
Environment, Population, 
and Sustainability (n=177) 
5 20 1 7 10 2 57 5 
Human Rights, Migration, 
and Refugees (n=204) 
10 10 11 18 8 2 40 5 
All Development and 
Assistance (n=3,740) 
11 24 8 15 10 3 29 100 
General (n=796) 9 29 9 15 11 2 25 100 
Source: Adopted from Kerlin and Reid (2006) “The International Charitable Nonprofit 
Sub-sector in the United States.” National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar 
National Nonprofit database. 
Note: Percentages may not sum across to 100 due to rounding. 
 
The growth of INGOs is not equally spread across the world with global 
organizations making up over 50 percent of these organizations that receive government 
grants. Although these global INGOs operate in multiple regions, they are mostly 
concentrated in large numbers in Europe and North America. The large number of 
organizations operating globally in the dataset introduces imprecision in our analysis, as 
their work cannot be accounted for in the breakdown of organizations operating in one 
world region.  
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Table 8 summarizes the number, percentage, and funding of government-funded 
development and assistance organizations by world region, and clearly shows that Central 
Europe and Central Asia receive the most in terms of government grants, followed by the 
Middle East and North Africa regions. Latin America and the Caribbean receive the 
fewest grants from the U.S. government followed by the Western Europe, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan regions. The large number of INGOs that operate 
globally makes it difficult to determine the percentage of official aid reaching various 
regions of the world through these organizations, although generally, the regions of Latin 
America, the Middle East, East Europe, Central Asia, and North Africa receive more 
official aid compared to sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia and the Pacific. 
Organizations with a single regional focus indicate that Agriculture Development 
organizations operate mostly in Latin America; Economic Development nonprofits have 
an emphasis on Central Europe and Central Asia and Latin America; Educational 
Development is relatively high in Latin America and the Caribbean, South and East Asia 
and the Pacific, and the Middle East and North Africa, and Health Development 
organizations are concentrated in Latin America. 
Although the data show that over time INGOs have increased in all regions, the 
highest expansion rates are in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by central Asia, and 
then by East Asia and the Pacific. The growth in Central and Eastern Europe is due 
mainly to the fall of state socialism and the introduction of freedom of association. 
Economic expansion and democratic reform explains the growth in Asia. 
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Importance of Research 
 
The relationship between government grants and charitable contributions in 
INGOs has not been explored in the economic literature to date. However, a better 
understanding of the relationship between government grants and charitable contributions 
is of paramount importance to INGO decision makers. They will be better equipped to 
leverage their organization’s fundraising activities, government funding and private 
charity to maximize their income and other resources and enhance their ability to address 
social problems globally. As with any government funding, contentious political debates 
related to any changes (positive or negative) in government grants to these institutions 
have arisen.32 This dissertation addresses some of these contentious issues by analyzing 
how government grants affect charitable contributions. This is important because the 
availability of these funds is usually not guaranteed to them on a yearly basis.
                                                 
32 Conservatives argue that INGOs attract enough non-government support to warrant government grants 
and that federal aid discourages private charitable giving to these organizations. On the other hand, liberals 
and the staff of these institutions often complain of the shortage of funds, the financial struggles they 
undergo in raising revenue, and the difficulty of meeting their operating costs and so advocate and welcome 
government grants. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT CROWD-OUT 
 
A large body of research has dwelled on the effect government grants to 
nonprofits have on the private donors to these institutions, with mixed results. Part of the 
literature focuses on the effect of direct government grants to a charitable organization on 
donations to that organization; another part of the literature focuses on the effect of 
general government transfer spending on charitable donations.  
 
Motivation for Giving 
 
INGOs vary in their purpose and objectives, and have clienteles far removed from 
donors.  Hence the motives for making donations to them may vary significantly from 
their nonprofit counterparts in the U.S. Several authors have tried to show why 
individuals donate to nonprofits in general, with some suggesting that it may be 
influenced by an experience in one’s youth Schervish (1997); others suggest that it is 
associated with religious. heritage, personal philosophy, social responsibility, and 
political beliefs Boris (1987). Still others have argued that donors have to be asked to 
contribute Hodgkinson and Weitzman (1996). Some authors have formulated models in 
which individuals are not only motivated by economic costs and benefits, but also have a 
moral or norm-based motivation.
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The literature indicates that there are many unique benefits that 
contributors/donors to nonprofits experience apart from valuing the organization’s output. 
Vesterlund (2006) shows that the most obvious benefit from giving is the output 
produced by a nonprofit organization: individuals who benefit from the nonprofit’s 
output are referred to as “altruistic”. Since these institutions produce mostly public goods, 
the literature concludes that a charity’s output is normally not the primary explanation of 
why people donate to nonprofits, because donors would free-ride. The strong incentive to 
free-ride has led researchers to argue that other benefits explain why most households in 
the U.S. choose to make charitable contributions. That is, that there are other unique 
benefits that only contributors experience that motivate them to donate and not view 
donations by others as a perfect substitute for their private donations. The extreme 
argument is that the private benefit of donating is no different from that of purchasing 
any other private good, although private benefits of donating may be less tangible 
(Becker 1974; Glazer and Konrad 1996; Harbaugh 1998a; Tullock 1966). Private benefits 
from donating have also been argued to be more intrinsic in nature33 (Andreoni 1989; 
1990; Arrow 1974; Rose-Ackerman 1982; Sen 1977). Although the benefits stipulated by 
different authors differ from one another, they are all “private” in the sense that only the 
individual responsible for the donation gets to experience the benefit 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Refers to motivation to engage in the act of donating for no compelling reason beyond the satisfaction 
derived from the act itself (i.e. refers to motivation to donate when one does not have to do anything). 
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Crowding Out/In of Private Donations to INGOs 
 
The conventional finding is that government grants crowd out charitable giving. 
This conventional understanding has been contradicted by some researchers who argue 
that donors lack knowledge or concern about nonprofit's revenue from government 
sources. Other findings conclude that government grants to the nonprofit sector most 
often predict an increase in charitable donations. These contradictory findings underline 
the need to identify the correct causal mechanisms that explain the government funding-
charitable giving relationship. Other factors in the literature that affect donations include 
fund-raising efforts (Weisbrod and Domiguez (1986), a nonprofit's mission-related 
outputs and its reputation for efficiency and integrity (hence its trustworthiness to use 
donated funds effectively), and the perception by the public that nonprofits are self-
serving entities that pursue the interests of their top officials and board members 
(Hancock (1996).  
 
Crowd-Out/In Theory 
 
The idea, made popular by Barro (1974), that government spending on public 
goods might crowd out voluntary donations of time and money, may be traced back to the 
classical economist Ricardo, for whom the idea of “Richardian equivalence” is named. 
As noted earlier, complete crowd-out theory is the basis for the classical model and 
predicts that, because nonprofits produce public goods, free-riding occurs and hence 
complete crowd-out of private contributions is observed in the presence of government 
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grants if output produced by the organizations is the focus of individuals. A model where 
the nonprofits' output is the sole motive of giving predicts that donors are indifferent 
toward the source of funding and hence nullify government grants (raised through 
taxation) by reducing their contributions to the charity dollar-for-dollar, resulting in 
complete crowd-out. The model predicts that government grants completely crowd out 
private contributions (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Roberts 1984, 1987; Warr 
1982; 1983). The authors, applying this line of thinking to the private provision of public 
goods, note that if donors were “pure altruists”, then production by the government 
would crowd out voluntary donations toward the private production of similar goods by 
private citizens and the nonprofit sector.  
  Bergstrom, Blume et al. (1986) show that two conditions must be met for the 
complete crowd-out prediction: a) that the tax for government contribution be limited 
only to those who contribute to the charity, and b) that none of the present contributors 
stop giving after the tax has been levied. Sugden (1982) and Margolis (1982) point out in 
their papers that when there are many donors, an increase in one person's contribution is 
almost completely offset by decreases in other people's contributions. Andreoni (1988) 
extends, formalizes, and proves this argument using the classical model. Another 
prediction of the classical model is that the levels of services experienced with or without 
the individual donation are almost the same. 
Though earlier theoretical and empirical work (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 
1986; Roberts 1984; Warr 1983) indicated that complete crowd-out was possible, more 
recent work has shown that better and improved methods and data puts this view in 
doubt. Duncan (1999) observes, though, that the hypothesis of a complete crowd-out 
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cannot be rejected when the joint effect on contributions of time and money are included. 
Most studies however, reject the hypothesis of a complete crowd-out and find the degree 
of crowd-out to range from 0.5 percent to 3.5 percent per unit of government spending 
Steinberg (1991). Abrams and Schmitz (1978; 1984), using tax data, show that 
government grants crowd out private contributions at the rate of about 28 percent, while 
Clotfelter (1985) estimates that crowd-out is only 5 percent, suggesting that concern for 
the nonprofit’s output is not the primary reason for giving. Andreoni (1989; 1990) 
proposes a situation under which the government provision of public goods would not 
completely crowd out private donations to such a good because of what he termed as 
impure altruism. Under this formulation, government spending on public goods need not 
crowd out private donations one-for-one, although some degree of crowding out was still 
likely. Kingma (1989), using data from the National Public Radio and looking at 
crowding-out as well as income and price effects of donations, also finds crowding-out to 
be less than complete (13.5 percent). Day and Devlin (1996) examining volunteering in 
Canada and the response to government expenditure outlays, find that although the level 
of government spending influences the decision to volunteer, it has no effect on the 
number of hours donated, and the outcome of the relationship depended on the type of 
government expenditure. Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), examining a panel of donations and 
government funding from 125 international relief and development organizations from 
the United States between 1986–1992, find that private donations at most decrease by 13 
cents for every dollar increase in government funding. They show that even when the 
clientele of INGOs are far removed from the donor, the motive for giving an additional 
dollar is private with less concern for the organization’s output. Bergstrom, Blume et al. 
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(1986) show that if donors are treated as a group separate from non-donors, then an 
increase in government expenditures for charitable goods, funded by a redistribution of 
income across both donors and non-donors, will result in only partial crowd-out. 
Despite the assumption that charitable private donors base their contributions on 
their knowledge of the amount of government grants these organizations receive, most of 
the articles in the literature find either no crowd-out of government transfers, or they find 
crowd-in. These results (i.e., of little or no crowd-out) contrast with the theoretical 
results, which suggest large crowd-out (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Roberts 
1984). Some experimental evidence Andreoni (1993) also shows large (but still 
incomplete) crowd-out in laboratory settings. Brown (1997) notes that if government 
spending on public goods can act as a signal to donors about the number of people in 
poverty, then it can lead to the possibility of crowding-in, or an increase in private 
donations. Such crowding-in might occur if donors saw increased spending as a signal 
that their donations would now be more effective and would have a higher marginal 
product. Posnett and Sandler (1989), examining donations to U.K. charities in 1985, find 
that government grants to nonprofits increase individual donations to the charity. In a 
similar study, Khanna, Posnett et al. (1995), examining a panel of 159 U.K. charities, find 
that government grants encourage rather than decrease private giving, leading to a 
crowding-in effect. Schiff (1990) proposes that government funding may actually 
enhance utility derived from charitable giving by acting as a signal of nonprofits’ quality 
to private donors, thus increasing private giving. Sugden (1982) and Rose-Ackerman 
(1981) conclude that a crowd-in effect occurs when the government’s donations serve as 
a signal of the quality of the charitable good provided or if the production of the 
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charitable good exhibits increasing returns to scale. Duncan (1999) argues that some 
donors contribute because they want to make a difference and become worse off when 
contributions of others increase. Therefore, increased government contributions to a 
nonprofit may increase the individual’s contribution. Brooks (2000b) hypothesizes a 
curvilinear effect in which crowding-in is observed with a smaller proportion of 
government funding that stimulates private giving up to a certain threshold, after which 
crowding-out is observed with increased government funding. He finds that orchestras 
benefited from a crowding-in effect up to $8,200 in government support per concert; 
above this level, crowding-out was dominant. 
 
Fundraising Activities 
 
The bulk of theoretical and empirical analysis has assumed that charities played 
active roles in soliciting for donations from private donors. Nonetheless INGOs usually 
have budgets that run in hundreds of thousands and sometimes in the millions of dollars. 
Funding such large budgets demands significant fundraising efforts on the part of these 
institutions. Some research has found strong evidence that government grants to 
nonprofits cause significant reductions in fundraising efforts (Kingma (1989). Andreoni 
and Payne (2003) develop a theoretical model to show that a charity that chooses its level 
of fundraising strategically reduces fundraising in response to government grants, and 
found empirically that indeed there is strong evidence that government grants to 
nonprofits cause significant reductions in fundraising efforts. They emphasize that 
charitable fund-raising activities may add another dimension to the crowding-out theory, 
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i.e., that an increase in government funding causes significant reductions in fund-raising 
efforts. Commenting on the empirical study, (Abrams and Schmitz 1985; Driessen 1984; 
Straub 2004) conclude that the “behavior of nonprofits” should be taken into account; 
otherwise conclusions of crowding-out of charitable giving by government funding may 
actually be a result of a nonprofit’s strategic decision making. This strategic response 
may help explain the incomplete crowding-out of government grants to private charities. 
Altruism theory seems consistent with fundraising practices of INGOs, which provide the 
donors with specific information on the potential value of contributions and on their 
overhead costs. 
This study adds to the literature by extending the crowd-out theory to INGOs and 
by simultaneously measuring the crowd-out effect of government grants on private 
donations and fundraising activities on six major sub-categories of INGOs by using the 
same data set. A summary of previous research is included in Table B1 in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
This section outlines the basic theoretical foundations for philanthropy by 
drawing from various theoretical models by Andreoni (1988; 2006) and a paper by 
Andreoni and Payne (2003). We show a theoretical relationship between government 
grants, private donations, and fundraising expenditures in explaining the crowding-out 
theory. 
The adopted theoretical models are motivated by the fact that economists have 
only just begun to take seriously the effects of fundraising (the demand side of the 
charity) in undertaking the effect of government grants on charitable giving. Past 
economic research focused almost exclusively on donors (the supply side of charity) 
when explaining the effect of government grants on charitable giving mainly due to the 
difficulty in establishing theoretically how fund-raising works. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
  
Our theoretical framework is adopted from the one developed by  Andreoni and 
Payne (2003). It is based on conclusions drawn from (Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Kolm 
1969) that charitable giving, motivated out of altruism, creates a public good out of 
charity.  The model is based on the “continuing campaigns” category of fund-raising 
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identified by Andreoni (1998).34  The continuing campaigns model is in turn tied to the 
“power of the ask model” Andreoni (2003). Both charities and donors report that the 
most effective fund-raising tool is to directly ask someone to donate.35  
Our contributions to the theoretical models we have adopted from various papers 
by Andreoni include: 1) assuming that fund-raisers seek to maximize the lifetime stream 
of contributions; 2) assuming that fund-raisers live for two periods only; and 3) using the 
theoretical models to explain crowd-out on international organizations.  
We precede our theoretical model by first describing in detail Andreoni’s 
summarized theoretical models that assume charities have no active role to play in 
extracting donations from potential donors. We then proceed to summarize the role the 
government plays in the crowding-out model and follow this by showing how crowding 
out occurs and the reason why a complete crowd-out may take place.  We summarize this 
model to show how warm glow affects the crowding-out theory. Finally, we summarize 
Andreoni and Payne’s (2003) theoretical model and then introduce fundraising as an 
explanation for the crowding-out observed in the literature. 
 
Model of Private Giving to Public Goods 
  
We adopt the summarized version by Andreoni (2006). In this model, only 
individuals provide goods through voluntary donations. Here, pure public goods are 
inefficiently provided, which justifies the involvement of the government in providing 
                                                 
34 Continuing campaigns raise the operating funds for on-going charities and are unlikely to be built around 
revealing information about the charity but focus instead on revealing information about the donors. 
 
35 Other continuing campaign categories of fund-raising include “donors are recognized” and “charity 
raisers and auctions” models.  See Andreoni (2006). 
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public goods (Becker 1974; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986). Government 
involvement in the provision of public goods in this model was initially thought to be an 
efficiency-enhancing supplement to private donors.  The model, developed by Becker 
(1974) has the following assumptions: 
1) There are i = 1,…, n individuals in the economy 
2) Each individual i consume a composite private good iχ and a public good G. 
3) Individual’s donation to G = ig  
4) G is defined as i
n
i gG ∑ == 1  
5) Each person is endowed with money income im  
6) Preferences are ( )Gii ,χμ  since G is a pure public good. 
7) The public good can be produced from the private good with a simple linear 
technology. 
Each individual faces the following optimization problem; 
( )
0
..,
1
,
≥=
=+
∑
=
i
n
j
j
iiiig
ggG
mgtsGMax
ii
χχμχ
                                                                            (1) 
Assuming that each person i takes the contributions of others as given, the model 
can be solved by assuming Nash equilibrium. Letting ∑ ≠− −== ij iji gGgG equal the 
total contributions of all individuals except person i, the optimization problem can be 
rewritten with each individual choosing G rather than ig as shown below; 
( )
i
iiiiG
GG
GmGtsGMax
i
−
−
≥
+=+χχμχ ..,,
                                                                          (2) 
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According to Becker (1974), individuals act as though their “social income” 
.ii Gm −+  i.e., ii Gandm −  will have the same marginal effect on an individual’s optimal 
G. 
Solving the above equation by setting the marginal rate of substitution equal to 1 
and assuming that people can only give positive amounts to the public good, the 
individual’s best reply function can be rewritten as; 
( ){ }0,max iiiii GGmfg −− −+=  
Finally assuming that the public good is a normal good and that the private good 
is strictly normal for all individuals is sufficient to guarantee that there exists a unique 
Nash equilibrium, i.e., there exists a 10 ' 〈Φ≤〈Φ ifthatsuch  for all i in the set of 
givers. The decision problem and Nash equilibrium can be illustrated in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: Nash Equilibrium in the Provision of Public Goods 
 
 
 
The “endowment point” can be seen where consumption ii m=χ  and the public 
good 1−= GG . When the classic model of Samuelson (1954) is applied to voluntary 
giving above, we see that as individuals decide to give, iχ  can be traded for more G 
along the 45-degree line above. In equilibrium, all individuals consume the same G but, 
assuming different preferences and incomes, different iχ . It can also be seen that private 
giving will not be Pareto efficient. Figure 3 therefore suggests a partnership between 
government and charitable donors. 
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According to the Samuelson conditions, G reaches the efficient level 
when ∑∑ == ==⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∂∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∂
∂
n
i i
n
i
i
i
i
MRSG
11
1
χμ
μ
.36 But each giver is setting MRSi =1 
hence ∑=ni iMRS1  is in excess of 1 whenever at least one person is giving, implying 
inefficiently low G. 
 
Crowding-Out Theory 
 
This is based upon a model of Warr (1982). Warr’s model shows that any “small” 
lump sum tax on donors that is contributed to the public good will completely crowd out 
private donations, i.e., the substitution will be dollar-for-dollar. Building on this model, 
Roberts (1984) claimed that just like the expansion of government services to the poor 
was accompanied by a reduction in charitable giving to the poor during the great 
depression, this effect also occurs for all public-private partnerships. 
Re-writing the optimization problem above by introducing a lump sum tax it on 
person i with the proceeds donated to the public good, the individuals’ budget constraint 
becomes iiii mtg =++χ  leading to a total payment iii tgy += .  
Let ∑ ∑= ≠− == ni ij iii yYandyY 1  and let ( )**2*1 ,.............,, nggg , then the optimization 
problem above becomes: 
 
                                                 
36 The sum of the marginal rates of substitution equals the marginal cost. 
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( )
ii
iiiiYx
tYY
YmYtsYMax
i
+≥
+=+
−
−χχμ ..,,                                                                        
(3) 
.3int0 aboveconstrainequalitytheingi ≥  Equation 3 above will be the same as equation 
2 whenever *ii gt ≤ . 
 
Complete Crowding-Out 
 
Complete crowd-out occurs when everyone reduces their voluntary contribution 
by the amount of the involuntary contribution in equilibrium so as to keep their total 
utility-maximizing contributions the same. This can be demonstrated as below; 
Let ( )**2*1 ,.............,, nggg  be the Nash equilibrium donations with no government 
taxation. If lump sum taxes *0 ii gt ≤≤  for all i are donated to the public good, the 
equilibrium donation after taxation will be iii tgg −= *' for all i. The total supply of the 
public good will be unchanged. The model assumes that people are indifferent between 
voluntary giving ig  and involuntary giving it . 
The intuition explained above can be shown in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Complete Crowding Out 
 
 
Figure 4 indicates that in equilibrium, each person acts as though they are choosing their 
total gift, iii tgy += . When one of the factors of the sum is forced to move in one 
direction, the other element will respond with an equal and opposite change. Note that if 
the tax were to rise to ** χ−== mgt , then the person’s private contribution would be 
driven to zero. Any tax beyond this would be non-neutral, and would force total 
payments to rise.37 
                                                 
37 According to Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), since a good deal of taxation involves individuals 
who are not givers or for whom  ti > gi, total provision of the public good will increase. 
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Warm-Glow Giving Model 
 
To capture warm-glow effects, an individual’s contribution can be put in the 
utility function directly as: 
( )iiii gG ,,χμμ =  
Donations in this utility function will have some qualities of public goods, but also some 
properties of private goods.38 The individual’s optimization problem, assuming the 
inequality constraint is not binding, is: 
( ) iiiiiig mgtsgGMax =+χχμχ ..,,,  
When an individual chooses G rather than ig , the above optimization problem is 
re-written as: 
( ) iiiiiG GmGtsGGMaxi −− +=+− χχμχ ..,,  
We can argue that the utility function can be re-written as: 
( ) iiiiii GGGmfg −−− −+= ,  
Taking the derivative of the above function with respect to iG−  and letting sif  be the 
derivative with respect to social income and wif  be the derivative with respect to the 
second term (i.e., the warm-glow term)39, the result is: 
( ) wisi
w
i
s
i
i
i
ff
ff
dG
dg
+−−=
−+=
−
1
1
 
                                                 
38  See (Andreoni 1989, 1990; Cornes and Sandler 1984; Steinberg 1984, 1987) 
 
39 According to Andreoni (1989; 1990), wif > 0 and 0 < 
s
if < 1 is true for normal goods. 
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The expression ( )sif−− 1  captures the case with no warm-glow. Others gifts are a 
perfect substitute for one’s own; hence, increased giving by others causes people to 
reduce their gift. The expression wif  captures the warm-glow effect. The explanation 
here is that with warm-glow a person is no longer as willing to reduce his own 
contribution in response to increased gifts by others. 
When people care only for warm-glow, then 0=
−i
i
dG
dg
, implying that crowding out 
will no longer be complete.40 Putting warm-glow into the model, while intuitively 
appealing, is at most an ad hoc fix, which can only be indirectly tested (Ribar and 
Wilhelm (2002). Experimental data, though, overwhelmingly support the warm-glow 
effect (Andreoni 1993; 1995; Andreoni and Miller 2002; Palfrey and Prisbrey 1996; 
1997), and provides the needed evidence to turn this ad hoc fix into a solid foundation for 
motivations of giving to charities.  
The theoretical models above (see especially equation 2 above) indicate that 
government grants and charitable fund-raising are likely to be jointly determined and that 
government grants crowd out private giving, resulting in the classic crowd-out 
hypothesis. In this dissertation, we assume that in the case of INGOs the warm glow 
effect is dominant (see equation 4) and that this might lead perhaps to crowding-out being 
small or non-existent in these kind of organizations. This leads us to the rationale for our 
theoretical model. We look at fund-raising as the INGOs’ way of being strategic players 
in attracting private contributions from potential givers and as an explanation of the 
                                                 
40 This is true only so long as warm-glow does not extend to gifts made involuntarily through taxes. 
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crowd-out observed in the literature. In particular, we will portray the influence on 
contributions received by charities and how charities respond to government grants. 
 
Dominance of Warm-Glow 
 
Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) show that as the economy grows large warm-glow 
becomes the dominant if not the exclusive motive for giving at the margin. Since 
experimental data overwhelmingly support warm-glow preferences, we can assume that 
as the size of the charity grows, all giving due to altruism will be crowded out, leaving 
only giving due to warm-glow. In equation 3a below, as n increases, the relative 
importance of α  (the utility parameter on altruism) diminishes and in the limit, choices 
are dictated by β (the warm-glow parameter). Thus, in the limit, giving becomes a solely 
private good and all the implications of neutrality disappear. 
This argument is developed as follows. 
We assume that the economy has n individuals with identical incomes m and 
identical Cobb Douglas preferences as: 
iii gInGInxIn βαμ ++=                                                                                            (3a) 
The first order conditions are then: 
0111 =++−− ii gGgm
βα  
The Nash equilibrium gifts will be the same for all i since individuals are identical, giving 
us G* = ng*. 
The Nash equilibrium thus becomes; 
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βα
βα
++
+=
n
mnmg
1
*  
From the above, we deduce that α
α
+= n
mg *  if there were only altruism and no 
warm-glow. In this case, as n increases, each person’s equilibrium gift asymptotes to zero 
while total giving asymptotes to mα . 
When there is only warm-glow and no altruism, then, ( )β
β
+= 1
* mg  (which is 
independent of n). 
 
The Power of the Ask Model41 
 
In this model donors have latent demands to give, but transaction costs such as 
finding the address or simple procrastination keep them from giving.42 When contacted 
by a charity, their costs fall drastically and so they give. The model is based on models of 
advertising that reduce or eliminate prohibitive search costs.43 
We adopt Andreoni and Payne’s (2003) model, and assume that INGOs differ on 
some dimension Θ and that each charitable donor has a favorite Θ. Charitable donors 
give to the INGO whose Θ is closest to their favorite when contacted by several INGOs. 
Here solicitations through fundraising increase charitable donations for two reasons. 
                                                 
41 A detailed mathematical derivation of the theoretical model is attached in Appendix B. 
 
42 See O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), and their “models of procrastination”. 
 
43 The assumption here is that individuals do not exercise their demand for a good unless they receive an 
advertisement from a seller. Precedence of this assumption is in the literature on advertising. 
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First, they turn non-donors into donors, and secondly, they move charitable donors to 
charities they prefer. 
We assume, for the sake of modeling, that individuals will not give unless they 
are solicited, at which point they will give. How much they give depends on how close 
the INGO is to their ideal Θ. As in Andreoni and Payne (2003), we assume for simplicity 
that charitable donors give exclusively to an INGO nearest its ideal. Fundraising is a 
requirement in our model because of the assumption that people need to be asked to 
donate. 
In summary, our theoretical model, based on models stipulating that advertising 
reduces or eliminates prohibitive search costs, incorporates the following assumptions; 
1) Charities differ qualitatively in the services they provide. 
2) Individuals differ in the quality of charity they prefer. 
3) Individuals face high costs of finding the names and addresses and qualities of 
charities. 
4) Individuals will only give when they are solicited by a charity. 
5) Charities first set their fundraising levels and then they move simultaneously. 
Givers move second and play a Nash equilibrium giving game. 
For simplicity, we also assume that: 
1) Fund-raisers seek to maximize the lifetime stream of contributions. 
2) Fund-raisers live for two periods. Hence the INGO (fund-raiser institution) 
seeks to maximize the following objective function: 
 
 
{ } ( ){ }, , 1  jt j j t jt jt rj jt j tMax C S P Cν β +Θ = − Θ + Θ    (1) 
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where: 
 
, ,j t jtij t
C y G= +∑   
,ij ty (Gjt) is the contribution of individual i to charity j, at period t. 
jtG  is the level of government grants received by charity j.  
jtj
SC
j
Θ−
,
refers to net utility of the INGO at time t, which depends positively 
on ,j tC . 
 
In other words ,ij ty (Gjt) represents the equilibrium condition levels ,ij ty * = ,ij ty * (G). 
Thus, we can define the level of total charitable contributions to institution j at time t 
as ,j tC .  Also, the activities of fund raising are costly, hence  0jS ≥  represents the 
disutility to the charity managers of engaging in fund-raising, while 
j
Θ is managers’ 
effort on fund raising.  Therefore, the term 
j
Θ reflects managerial time in screening, and 
following up possible contributors. 
In (1) the expression ( ){ }, 1r j j tP Cβ +Θ  represents the discount utility of the 
expected contributions at period t+1, where: 
( )r jP Θ  is the probability of obtaining an amount of contributions , 1j tC +  at period t+1. 
β   refers to the discount factor (e.g., the higherβ  is, the more important is the future). 
 
We finally assume that INGOs exert effort in the first period, while the return or 
gain of fund raising is reflected in the expected contributions at period t+1. At period t, 
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the contributions at
tj
C ,  = jtij Gy +∑  are given. Hence the problem for fundraisers is 
to exert the effort at period t ( jtΘ ) that maximizes the lifetime utility of the organization. 
The optimality conditions are given by: 
{ }' , 1 0j j j j t
j
S P C
ν β +∂ = − + =∂Θ   
 
( )1 ,, , .............t j tG y∗ ∗Θ = Θ ∑  (2) 
 
The first order conditions imply that the organizations exert effort to raise funds at 
the point in which the marginal cost of fund raising jS−  is equal to the expected marginal 
utility gain of increasing contributions at period t+1 (or equivalently { }' , 1j j tP Cβ + .44 
Andreoni and Payne (2003) argue that individuals and charities alike report that 
givers give primarily because they are asked. Thus, we will also assume that the effect of 
fund raising efforts on the expected contributions is driven by “the power of the ask” in 
our model. However, since it is engaging in fund raising, a rational organization will not 
pursue their efforts to a point in which the marginal expected contributions are lower than 
the resources consumed in fund raising. The expression ( )1 ,, , .............t j tG y∗ ∗Θ = Θ ∑  
in (2) is the optimal value function, or the optimal level of effort at period t, which 
depends on contributions at period t and t+1.45  Thus we are interested in calculating the 
effect of government’s grant at period t. We can obtain this result by calculating: 
                                                 
44 To simplify the analysis, we are assuming that the efforts of fund raising affect only the expected amount 
of contributions, through the effect of effort on the probability to raise a certain amount of funds , 1j tC + . In 
the future, we can remove this assumption to allow the total amount of funds to depend on the effort. 
45 Using the function ( )1 ,, , .............t j tG y∗ ∗Θ = Θ ∑  into the lifetime utility at the optimum which is 
given by ( )( )1 1 , , 1, , , ,j j t t j t ij tv v G G y y∗ ∗ ∗+ += Θ •∑ ∑  
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*
2
2
0j GG
ν
ν
∂−∂Θ ∂Θ∂ >=∂ ∂ <
∂Θ
.  
To do so, we can express the first order condition in (2) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
, ,' 0j j j t j j tj j rj j
j rj j
C S
S P
P
νν ∗⎧ ⎫Θ − + Θ∂ ⎪ ⎪= − + Θ =⎨ ⎬∂Θ Θ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (2’) 
In (2’) we have used the optimality condition in (2) and the lifetime utility of the NGO 
evaluated at the optimum. In (2’) ( )'rj rj j jP P= ∂ Θ ∂Θ . Thus we obtain: 
    
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )ΘΘ+Θ−ΘΘ+ΘΘ ∂
∂∗ΘΘ
=∂
Θ∂
'2''"
,'
*'**
***
rrjrrrrr
tj
rr
PPSPPPPP
G
C
PP
G λλ       (3) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( ){ } 0*'** '2''" ≤ΘΘ+Θ−ΘΘ+ΘΘ= rrjrrrrr PPSPPPPP λλγ  by the 
second order sufficient conditions for an optimum of (1). In the numerator of (3) 
( ) ( ) 0, <>∂∂Θ∗Θ′ GCPP tjjrjjrj . Hence, 
*
0jG
∂Θ >
∂ < . We get an ambiguous result meaning that 
government grants to INGOs do not necessarily crowd out the activities of fund raising of 
INGO’s. 
The result is intuitive: An increase in government’s contribution at period t has an 
ambiguous effect on the marginal expected contributions at period t+1.46  On the one 
hand, an increase on government’s grants at period t has a direct positive effect on the 
lifetime contributions of the INGO (which reduces effort on fund raising); however, on 
                                                 
46 If the effect of government’s grants reduces the marginal utility of the expected contributions in period 
t+1, then this will induce INGOs to reduce efforts on fund raising. If the effect of government’s grants 
increases the marginal utility of the expected contributions in period t+1, then this will induce INGOs to 
increase efforts on fund raising, a crowd-in effect. 
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the other hand, a government grant at period t might crowd out private contributions and 
hence the overall expected contributions at t+1.  
 
Link between the Theory and Empirical Methodology 
 
Our theoretical model predicts that fundraising can have two opposing influences 
on private donations.  On the one hand, when charities ask for less in the presence of 
government grants,47 they reach fewer donors and private donations fall. On the other 
hand, when INGOs do not reduce their fundraising efforts in the presence of government 
grants, private donations might increase. In this case, government grants will have the 
effect of crowding in donations. This can happen because of various reasons discussed 
below. In other words, our model predicts that government grants do not necessarily 
crowd out the activities of fundraising of INGOs and by extension private donations to 
these institutions. 
In addition to affecting fund-raising, a change in government grants can also 
result in a direct effect on individuals’ contributions to the INGO. Individuals may 
respond directly through crowding-out or crowding-in (see the reasons given below) and 
indirectly due to changes in fundraising efforts. Donations cost can increase (in cases 
where the INGO reduces its fundraising activities) or decrease (in cases where the INGOs 
either increase their fundraising efforts or continue at the same level of fundraising 
activity). 
When the INGOs are “satisfiers” who have revenue goals and stop when they are 
reached, government grants will lead to a reduction of fundraising efforts and we will 
                                                 
47 This might be due to the marginal benefit of fundraising effort reducing. 
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observe a crowding-out effect.48 Marginal revenues here may exceed marginal costs. This 
is due in part to classic crowding-out, but also to the fact that any solicitation will likely 
be less productive and the institutions in this case will choose to reduce fund-raising 
efforts. The net effect of a government grant in the case where fundraising falls will be to 
reduce donations to the recipient nonprofit. We observe a crowding-out effect in part 
because donors give less as they shift their donations to competing nonprofits when a 
specific charity asks only a few of them and does not reach others. By channeling some 
of the charity’s income away from direct program expenses, increased fundraising may 
be perceived by donors as increasing the price of giving, and this also might lead to 
reduced contributions by donors. 
On the other hand, if INGOs are net-revenue maximizers and act like a business, 
they will continue spending dollars on fundraising until the marginal dollar spent raises 
an additional dollar of funds. The impact of government grants will be a crowding-in of 
charitable contributions especially with no change on fundraisers of INGOs. In our 
model, fundraising remains constant or increases in period t+1. Despite the charity 
receiving grants from the government, solicitations will increase donations by turning 
non-donors into donors, and by moving donors to charities they prefer. In this role, 
fundraising acts like advertising and stimulates giving by informing the public and 
soliciting contributions (Khanna and Sandler (2000). Here, government grants have the 
potential for crowding-in donations. Since INGOs operate far from the donors who have 
limited capacity to monitor them, government grants may also cause a crowding-in effect 
                                                 
48  The theoretical model predicts that an INGO might decide to reduce fund-raising efforts when it gets a 
grant from the government. 
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by affecting donors in several ways.49 i.e., grants enhance the reputation of a charity in 
the view of donors (Rose-Ackerman (1982; 1987); Government grants also increase the 
willingness of potential donors to contribute since information asymmetries are limited 
due to government officials’ capacity to monitor these institutions where they operate. 
The monitoring function of government grants also may act like a price reducer in the 
minds of donors especially when they perceive that administration costs and fundraising 
activities of these institutions will be kept in check. Government grants can also 
circumvent the standard neutrality theorem result that is behind crowding-out whenever 
the grants are financed in part from taxes on non-contributors; and finally, when there is a 
matching grant component, then government grants can reduce price and stimulate 
private donations. 
Another avenue by which government’s grants can affect fund raising activities of 
INGOs is through the role of repeated (or consistent lack of) contributions. For instance, 
it is simple to see that if government’s grants at t+1 depend on the stream of contributions 
on the past, then the marginal expected gain of fundraising (or the second term in 
condition 2) will be affected. It seems reasonable to argue that there might be donor’s 
fatigue. In this case, we need to replace ( ) ( )* * * ( ),rj rj j t tP P G GΘ = Θ  and ( )1t tG f G+ = . The 
last term reflects a recursive function in which donations at t+1 depends on past grants of 
the government. It is simple to see that this reinforces our previous findings that 
governments grants could have an effect in either way on INGO’s fund raising efforts. In 
our model, the possibility of crowd in effect on fund raising is explained by the 
uncertainty of INGOs with respect future contributions. That is, an increase of 
                                                 
49 Here the warm glow effect is dominant. 
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government’s grants today might reduce the potential expected contributions in the future 
for the INGO, which induces INGOs to increase their fundraising efforts. 
We test our theoretical model empirically to determine whether INGOs are net-
revenue maximizers or “satisfiers”. This will offer an explanation as to whether 
fundraisers or charitable donors account for crowding-out.
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter presents the empirical methodology and data sources. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
 
Previous empirical studies have captured a number of factors relevant to the effect 
of government grants on charitable contributions and fundraising activities. The literature 
on crowd-out varies considerably in data coverage, empirical specification and 
econometric procedures although research on crowding out is still inconclusive. Our 
objective in this dissertation is to extend the literature to international nonprofits by 
simultaneously measuring the effect of government grants on charitable contributions and 
fundraising activities. This is in line with recent research, which has tended to focus on 
the behavioral response of charities on government grants as a second reason for the 
crowd out observed in the literature. We adopt Dokko’s (2005) doctoral dissertation 
empirical methodology, which relates the effect of government grants simultaneously on 
charitable contributions and fundraising efforts of nonprofits. 
We complement and extend previous empirical studies along 3 dimensions. First, 
we adopt a reduced form approach, which includes simultaneous equations of 
determinants of charitable contributions and fundraising activities rather than on one 
particular structural or behavioral model. Second, we employ Baltagi’s error component 
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two stage least squares and fixed effects estimation techniques that control for 
endogeneity, omitted variable bias, simultaneity, and other econometric issues. Third, we 
extend the composition of nonprofits to international organizations. 
Our estimation framework is based on three types of variables – endogenous 
variables, predetermined/exogenous variables, and unobservable disturbance terms. For 
the functional composition, we estimate the following set of two equations. 
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Here the vector, D, captures the unobserved heterogeneity at organizational level and 
overtime. We assume that the vector of disturbances, ε , is mean independent of the 
predetermined variables, Ζ , such that: 
( ) ( ).,0 Ω=Ζ fpdf ε  
 
Simultaneous Equation Model and Two-stage Least Squares Estimation 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the above simultaneous equation 
model (SEM) yields biased estimates due to endogeneity problems or omitted variables in 
the specification. To overcome these problems, we use Baltagi’s 1984 error component 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression technique and fixed effects regression 
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technique. We use instruments for endogenous variables to deal with factors such as 
correlation between independent variables and the disturbance terms. We rule out the first 
differencing regression technique because the data pattern here leads to loss of a large 
percentage of the data.50  
In estimating equations (1) and (2), we are likely to potentially come across two 
problems: serial correlation and endogeneity. Serial correlation in the error process is a 
common problem in panel datasets, and if present, our standard errors can be severely 
biased Kezdi (2003). To solve for this problem, we perform the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel datasets (Drukker 2003; Woolridge 2003). The null hypothesis is 
that there is no serial correlation. We reasonably assume that the error terms are serially 
correlated within each organization but not in-between organizations. 
Endogeneity might be present due to private donations and government grants 
being jointly determined.51  It may also be due to a problem of reversed causality 
between private donations and fundraising expenditures making the measure of 
fundraising expenditures biased (i.e. fundraising expenditures are targeted to increase 
private donations, but low private contributions in one year can cause fundraising 
expenditures to increase within the same year and make fundraising measure to be 
negatively biased). We solve for this possible problem of endogeneity of government 
grants and fundraising expenditures by choosing to use instrumental variables. The use of 
instrumental variables allows us to have a variable that affects government grants but not 
                                                 
50 See Appendix E for the pattern of data. 
 
51 Unmeasured influences may be increasing both government grants and private donations and the measure 
of crowd-out would then be positively biased (i.e. after a catastrophe such as a hurricane, terrorist attack 
etc, the services of an INGO such as the red cross are in high demand). Contributions are thus likely to be 
sought from both private givers and government donors). 
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fund-raising or private contributions to allow for an estimate of the pure crowding out 
effect that holds constant the level of fundraising. Alternatively, we might look for a 
variable that affects fundraising but not government grants or private contributions to 
estimate the effect of fundraising on private giving, and subtract this effect from the total 
effect. 
In order to have good instruments, we look for instruments that must be strongly 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables and the dependent variables of 
interest and that should only be correlated with the dependent variables through the 
endogenous explanatory variables (i.e. they should not cause a change in the dependent 
variable directly). Since weak instruments lead to biased estimates, we carry out several 
tests. First, we carry out the Hansen-Sargan test to test for the over-identification 
restriction. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e., they are 
uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation). A rejection of the null will cast doubt on the validity of the 
instruments. Second, we check and use the rule-of-thumb in line with Stock and Watson 
(2003), which states that the first-stage F-statistic should be greater than 10 for 
instrumental variables to be strong. Last, we test for the endogeneity problem by carrying 
out a Hausman test for endogeneity. The assumption necessary to carry out a Hausman 
test is that the instruments are exogenous (the Hansen-Sargan test should indicate this to 
us). Our null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that government grants, fundraising 
expenditures, and private donations are exogenous. 
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Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation 
 
This is an estimation technique for dealing with factors such as correlation 
between independent variables and the disturbance terms by finding or creating a variable 
that is correlated with the variable being instrumented for and asymptotically 
uncorrelated with the disturbance term. We estimate equations 1 and 2 above and obtain 
predicted values of the endogenous variables as shown below; 
)4(exp
)3(
2
*
2
1
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1
ΖΠ=
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The resulting coefficients estimates are consistent.52 Correction of the standard errors 
entails our final step in estimating our SEM. In our estimation, we tackle this issue by 
insuring that at least one exogenous variable appearing in one equation does not appear in 
the other equation.53 Goodness of fit will be looked at after the first stage of the two-stage 
least squares to ensure that we have quality instruments since the higher the correlation 
with the endogenous variable the better.  
In identifying our instruments, we considered two factors: 
i) That our instruments be strongly correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable. 
ii) That they should only be correlated with the dependent variable 
through the endogenous explanatory variable (i.e., the instruments 
                                                 
52 In small samples, the IV estimator will be a biased estimator. 
 
53 The more such restrictions/exclusions the better. 
  
67
should not cause a change in the dependent variable directly). 
 
Based on the above, we have identified several instrumental variables for our endogenous 
variables, as explained below. 
 
Instruments for Government Grants 
 
The literature identifies several instruments for government grants. Kingma 
(1989) uses mean personal income in a nonprofit’s region as an instrument for 
government grants. Payne (1998) uses state level government transfer payments to 
individuals as an instrument in the first stage estimate of government grants.54 Andreoni 
and Payne (2003) use transfers to non-profits measured at the state level as instruments 
for government grants to nonprofits in their study. Breman (2005) uses government 
grants lagged one year as an instrument for government grants. Government grants do not 
vary substantially over time, and government grants in year t-1 should therefore be a 
good estimate of government grants in year t. 
We use federal-level measures of government transfers to individuals from SSI 
programs, government grants lagged one year, and transfers to non-profits measured at 
the federal level55 as our instruments for government grants. 
 
                                                 
54 One potential problem with this instrumental variable is that transfer payments to individuals are an 
automatic stabilizer, so when personal income experiences negative shocks, this instrument is likely to have 
a negative relationship with private contributions, independent of the mechanism through government 
grants (i.e. one may find partial crowding out even if the true relationship is one of perfect crowding out). 
 
55 These measures help control for the size of the government that has been spent on nonprofit activities, 
thus it proxies the size of the “pie” for which a nonprofit organization competes. 
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Instruments for Private Donations 
 
We have two instrumental variables for private donations. First, we lag private 
contributions variable and use it as an instrument for private contributions. Second, we 
use a measure of the price of a dollar of charitable contribution based on the federal 
income tax and rules for allowing deductions of those contributions (federal average 
marginal tax rate and year).56 This measure of price captures the efficiency of an 
organization in using donated revenue. An individual perceives the donations to be costly 
(a high price) if an organization is spending a high proportion of its donated revenue for 
the purpose of fundraising translating into less efficient behavior at the organization 
level, signaling the potential donor that their dollars might be better “used” elsewhere. 
Conversely, a low price signals the donor that the organization is acting efficiently and is 
likely to use the donated funds for production improvements rather than for additional 
fundraising. Organizations with a low price are going to attract more private donations.  
We calculate the price of a dollar of charitable donation as:57 
Priceit = (1-T) / (1 – Fit) 
 where:  T = the marginal federal income tax rate facing 
an individual donor. 
   Fit = the ratio of fundraising expenditure to total 
donations or the ith firm in the current period. 
                                                 
56 These data come from www.nber.org/~taxsim . 
 
57 The Priceit variable is defined by Okten and Weisbrod (2000).  The numerator is changed to 1 by 
Tinkleman (2004) because taxes are constant across all firms. 
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A negative variable for the price of a dollar of charitable donation implies that as the 
implicit price of giving rises, through higher fund-raising and administration expenditures 
in the previous period, charitable giving decreases in the current period. 
 
Instruments for Fundraising Expenditures 
 
We use the INGOs own capital and returns on financial assets as instruments for 
fundraising expenditures. These are similar to those used by Breman (2005). 
 
Data and Data Sources 
 
The U.S. international nonprofit dataset that is used is composed of nonprofit 
organizations that are private corporations created, maintained, and terminated by 
voluntary decisions of the trustees, board, and/or members of the organization; are 
registered in the United States with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as charitable tax-
exempt organizations (501 (c) (3)); receive over $25,000 in annual income’ and file an 
annual IRS form 990.58 They serve public purposes as organizations with missions and 
programs that are primarily international in purpose and scope; that is, they provide 
goods, services, and/or funds to individuals or institutional beneficiaries abroad and/or 
promote international understanding and/or address international policy issues here and 
abroad. The dataset of these organizations used in this study is drawn from information 
                                                 
58 Excluded are 501 (c)(3) private foundations and other non-charitable tax exempt organizations registered 
with the IRS such as trade unions, business organizations, social and recreational clubs, and veterans 
associations, classified under varying sections of the IRS code (e.g., 501 (c) (4) as well as many religious 
organizations that are exempt from filing). 
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included in the National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit 
Database (Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy (1998-2003).59 Other data come from 
the World Bank (2005). 
 
Data Problems 
 
As noted in the literature, the dataset we are using has some problems that need to 
be addressed. The potential problems that we will have to tackle include the following: 
 
1 The timing of government funding and the efforts expended towards fundraising may 
not fall within the same one-year period. To solve for this problem, we lag government 
funding in our dataset. The alternative is to take a moving average of the measures. 
Andreoni and Payne (2003) find robust results regardless of whether they use one or the 
other. 
 
2 By the definition of fundraising expenditures,60 a nonprofit may include the costs 
associated with applying for government funding, the costs of reporting and complying 
with the conditions of the grants, and the like, as a fundraising expenditure leading the 
coefficient on the fundraising measure to have a positive bias in our estimation. We 
address this issue by looking separately at the components of fundraising costs, 
                                                 
59 These data files are built from information from Form 990 that nonprofit organizations file annually with 
the U.S. IRS.  Form 990 contains basic financial information, as well as location, founding date, lobbying 
expenses, and other variables. 
 
60 ‘Fundraising expenditures’ is defined as the total expenses incurred in soliciting contributions, gifts, and 
grants. 
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specifically professional fundraising fees, portion of officers’ salaries allocated to 
fundraising, and the portion of overall salaries and wages allocated to fundraising.61 
 
3 The nature of the data set does not allow us to determine whether government grants 
are tied to the charitable organization receiving a matching grant. Matching grants that 
vary over time and within firms will make fixed effects of little use, and the coefficients 
on the fundraising expenditures will have a positive bias. Organization fixed effects and 
year fixed effects would control for some type of phenomenon although the most 
effective method of solving for this problem would be through the 2SLS estimation. 
 
4 These data cannot account for the actual number of U.S. nonprofits with international 
programs and the extent of the financial capacity and outputs provided by U.S. nonprofits 
in the international arena. This is because the dataset is comprised of organizations whose 
primary purpose falls into one of the international NTEE categories, and yet many 
organizations have mixed domestic and international purposes and programs.  Separating 
program expenditures for domestic and international programs is not feasible using 
information from the NCCS/Guidestar National Nonprofit Database, so some 
organizations with significant international programs are not captured in the dataset. The 
anomalies in the data are addressed by following set rules to exclude organizations from 
the sample and include others that are not typically captured in the dataset. For the 
purposes of this study, we are concerned with studying organizations that exhibit positive 
                                                 
61 See Andreoni and Payne (2003). 
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fundraising expenditures and government funding during the sample period.62 
 
5 Problems associated with the IRS sample of nonprofit tax returns are addressed by 
counterchecking this data by scanning the websites and communicating with these 
organizations to reconcile them. Expected problems include: many zeros reported in the 
measures of interest, divergent accounting practices among organizations that raise 
concern about the comparability of the tax return, and dramatic variation of the types of 
organizations that are considered a 501 (c) (3) organization, even within the NTEE 
classification of the organization. 
 
6 The only explicit measure of government funding is government grants to the 
organizations. Reimbursements to the non-profits for services provided under a 
government contract are imbedded in the non-profit’s measure of program service 
revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Organizations whose scope are national in purposes or are a national chapter of local organizations are 
excluded. We identify these organizations by searching for the word “national” or “America” in their 
websites and then reviewing their mission statements.   
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are presented below.  
(Variable names are given in Table 10.)  
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
p1tcont 10792 3.65 27.73 0.00 723.19 
gdp1 10792 34.39 0.86 32.67 35.57 
regime 10792 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Sep11 10792 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
pop65 10792 12.44 0.16 12.19 12.65 
      
popn1 10792 284.14 5.04 275.85 290.81 
dues 10792 0.02 0.19 0.00 5.68 
ps_exp 10792 3.41 25.48 0.00 704.03 
ps_rev 10792 0.27 2.34 0.00 76.95 
f_exp 10792 0.17 1.81 0.00 63.28 
      
g_grants 10792 0.75 8.66 0.00 332.04 
p1securn 10792 0.03 0.97 -33.28 49.30 
p1mexp 10792 0.26 1.22 -0.45 32.54 
trpyts 10792 1125.39 136.26 946.53 1328.71 
 
All variables are in millions of dollars, except transfer payments to all nonprofit 
organizations by the federal government and transfer payments to persons, which are in 
billions of dollars. The average private donations to INGOs are about $3.65 million in the 
sample period, while fundraising expenditures have a mean of $0.17 million. The 
government gives an average of $0.75 million to these institutions for the sample period 
considered in our study. The organizations’ program service revenues vary from a 
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minimum of $0.00 to a maximum of $76.95 million, although the average for all the 
institutions is $0.27 million. The list of variables used in this study to measure the impact 
of government grants on private donations and fundraising expenditures is not 
exhaustive, and many other factors not included in the above list also may have an 
influence on private donations and fundraising activities of INGOs. 
Table 10 shows a correlation matrix for the variables used in the regressions. 
There is no high correlation between the explanatory variables and private contributions 
except with program service revenues, fundraising expenses, government grants, and the 
organization’s own capital. We observe a high correlation between fundraising expenses, 
program service expenses and the organization’s own capital. In the case of government 
grants, we observe a high correlation with program service expenses and organization’s 
own capital. This implies that most of the explanatory variables only explain part of the 
variation in the dependent variables of my equations. Due to high correlation among 
some of the explanatory variables, we excluded gross domestic product, regime, 
population above 65 years, and total payments to persons as exogenous variables from 
the final estimations. The estimation results are presented and discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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  p1tcont gdp1 regime Sep11 pop65 popn1 dues ps_exp price1 ps_rev f_exp g_grants Lf_exp p1securn p1mexp lg_grants trpyts 
p1tcont 1                 
gdp1 0.007 1                
regime 0.004 0.602 1               
Sep11 0.004 0.775 0.658 1              
pop65 -0.001 0.253 0.152 -0.134 1             
popn1 0.006 0.906 0.870 0.866 0.186 1            
dues 0.035 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 1           
ps_exp 0.991 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.046 1          
price1 0.001 0.013 0.010 0.002 0.022 0.011 0.005 0.001 1         
ps_rev 0.018 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.121 0.100 0.002 1        
f_exp 0.705 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.045 0.656 0.002 0.004 1       
g_grants 0.597 0.009 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.007 0.020 0.583 0.001 0.022 0.457 1      
lf_exp 0.698 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.048 0.653 0.002 0.005 0.981 0.475 1     
p1securn 0.018 -0.048 -0.058 -0.057 -0.007 -0.061 0.006 0.046 0.000 0.014 0.037 0.009 0.038 1    
p1mexp 0.692 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.187 0.672 0.002 0.228 0.720 0.659 0.726 0.066 1   
lg_grants 0.521 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.508 0.001 0.032 0.406 0.948 0.429 0.013 0.616 1  
trpyts 0.006 0.896 0.849 0.906 0.057 0.991 -0.009 0.007 0.009 -0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 -0.061 0.000 0.001 1 
Note:  
p1cont = Private contributions       ps_rxp = Program service expenses 
price1 = Price of a dollar of donations      ps_rev = Program service revenue 
dues = Dues and assessments        gdp = Gross Domestic Product 
f_exp= Fundraising expenses        unemp = Unemployment rate 
g_grants = Government grants       pop65 = Population above 65 years 
p1securn = INGOs own capital       p1mexp = INGOs total assets 
trpyts = Total transfer payments to persons      tr_ngo = Total federal transfer payments to INGOs 
 
 
Table 10. Correlation Matrix
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CHAPTER VI 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the empirical results obtained from estimating 
Baltagi’s (1984) error component two-stage least squares (EC2SLS) random effects (RE) 
and fixed effects (FE) estimation models. We report results from the EC2SLS RE 
estimation procedure and the fixed effects (FE) estimator models. We give a detailed 
discussion of the results based on the RE results, and report FE estimation results for 
comparison. All the variables are in millions of dollars except total transfer payments to 
individuals which are in billions. We simultaneously estimate the two sets of equations so 
as to be able to address the simultaneity problem. We present our results from EC2SLS 
RE and FE estimations in Table 11, and, for comparison purposes, we include results 
from a balanced data set in Appendix H. 
  
77
Table 11: Dependent Variable – Private Contributions 
 
 
Random Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Fundraising 
Expenses 
3.193 
(0.176)** 
-1.004 
(0.192)** 
4.108 
(0.367)** 
2.335 
(0.099)** 
4.998 
(0.870)** 
4.539 
(0.614)** 
-14.094 
(2.910)** 
Government 
Grants  
-0.101 
(0.038)** 
0.428 
(0.051)** 
0.013 
(0.034) 
0.020 
(0.021) 
1.255 
(0.209)** 
-0.122 
(0.082) 
0.658 
(0.078)** 
Population -0.003 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.051 
(0.045) 
0.001 
(0.001)* 
Dues -0.325 
(0.422) 
0.016 
(0.635) 
-0.717 
(0.075)** 
-6.910 
(2.164)** 
0.521 
(0.496) 
-3.892 
(17.472) 
15.436 
(3.386)** 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.949 
(0.006)** 
1.050 
(0.004)** 
1.007 
(0.007)** 
0.966 
(0.005)** 
0.411 
(0.089)** 
1.004 
(0.020)** 
0.970 
(0.029)** 
Price1 -0.000 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.037) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.020 
(0.085) 
0.231 
(0.172) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.939 
(0.027)** 
-1.170 
(0.125)** 
-0.904 
(0.015)** 
-0.867 
(0.023)** 
-0.385 
(0.083)** 
-4.160 
(0.428)** 
-1.365 
(0.155)** 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Square 0.9803 0.9789 0.9766 0.9908 0.6740 0.9841 0.5731 
 
Fixed Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Fundraising 
Expenses 
18.147 
(2.831)** 
20.650 
(0.709)** 
26.907 
(450.149) 
8.057 
(5.407) 
19.578 
(19.053) 
0.226 
(0.171)* 
-373.5475 
(304.558) 
Government 
Grants  
-0.765 
(0.213)** 
-0.240 
(0.134)+ 
-13.403 
(114.971) 
0.468 
(0.452) 
-1.196 
(3.101) 
- 4.883 
(0.891)** 
7.235 
(5.542) 
Population -0.028 
(0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.009)** 
0.181 
(1.582) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
0.040 
(0.149) 
0.470 
(0.401) 
Dues -2.332 
(2.891) 
-1.211 
(1.170) 
6.821 
(79.964) 
-7.500 
(12.871) 
8.001 
(7.254) 
- 6.436 
(44.099) 
104.534 
(105.368) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.596 
(0.071)** 
1.044 
(0.006)** 
9.671 
(75.237) 
0.516 
(0.379) 
0.447 
(0.265)+ 
0.683 
(0.056)** 
1.141 
(0.606)+ 
Price1 -0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.044 
(0.039) 
0.001 
(0.085) 
-0.003 
(0.044) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
- 6.944 
(0.539)** 
1.632 
(2.047) 
Program Service 
Revenue 
-1.204 
(0.142)** 
-1.207 
(0.236)** 
-5.834 
(45.595)+ 
-0.516 
(0.368) 
-0.509 
(0.286)+ 
0.074 
(0.033)* 
-6.880 
(6.195) 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Square 0.6792 0.8458 0.7325 0.8801 0.1938 0.9569 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  All models include year dummies. 
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The coefficients of interest on regressions in Table 11 are government grants, 
private contributions, and fundraising expenses. Overall, our results for RE regression for 
all INGOs as a group indicate that government grants crowd out private contributions. A 
$1000 increase in government grants leads to a decrease in private contributions of 
approximately $100. On the other hand, fundraising activities and program service 
expenses crowd in private contributions. 
Table 12 shows that government grants crowd in fundraising expenses at about 
$47 per $1000 of government grants spent on these institutions.  
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Table12: Dependent Variable - Fundraising Expenses 
 
 
Random Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Private 
Contributions 
0.209 
(0.013)** 
-0.823 
(0.316)** 
0.015 
(0.009)+ 
0.277 
(0.032)** 
0.135 
(0.033)** 
-0.066 
(0.014)** 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Government 
Grants  
0.047 
(0.011)** 
0.331 
(0.228) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.048 
(0.026)+ 
-0.199 
(0.057)** 
-0.176 
(0.025)** 
0.015 
(0.013) 
Population 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.000)* 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
Dues 0.006 
(0.080) 
-0.002 
(0.593) 
-0.022 
(0.018) 
-1.604 
(0.875)+ 
-0.198 
(0.089)* 
-1.009 
(1.546) 
0.493 
(0.134) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
-0.197 
(0.013)** 
0.874 
(0.334)** 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.251 
(0.034)** 
-0.039 
(0.021)+ 
0.092 
(0.017)** 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
0.161 
(0.015)** 
-0.858 
(0.347)* 
0.016 
(0.008)+ 
0.271 
(0.036)** 
0.037 
(0.022)+ 
-0.434 
(0.095)** 
-0.026 
(0.014)+ 
P1securn 0.136 
(0.012)** 
-0.719 
(0.267)** 
0.006 
(0.003)* 
0.074 
(0.044)+ 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.100 
(0.075) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
P1Mexp 0.214 
(0.040)** 
-0.124 
(0.324) 
0.052 
(0.010)** 
-0.070 
(0.060) 
0.041 
(0.030) 
1.839 
(0.173)** 
0.012 
(0.022) 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Square 0.6007 0.0073 0.2764 0.6596 0.1634 0.7703 0.0377 
 
Fixed Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Private 
Contributions 
-1.464 
(223.200) 
-0.378 
(2.422) 
0.055 
(1.220) 
-0.417 
(18.642) 
-0.140 
(1.870) 
0.183 
(4.423) 
-0.062 
(0.113) 
Government 
Grants  
0.299 
(32.462) 
0.097 
(0.489) 
-- 0.208 
(7.437) 
-- -0.061 
(3.167) 
0.061 
(0.079) 
Population 0.001 
(0.076) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.082) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.001)+ 
Dues -- -0.023 
(0.610) 
-0.190 
(1.230) 
-- -0.325 
(0.896) 
1.768 
(45.478) 
0.558 
(0.631) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
1.473 
(222.215) 
0.403 
(2.575) 
-0.040 
(1.060) 
0.437 
(17.685) 
0.100 
(1.132) 
-0.124 
(2.546) 
0.048 
(0.086) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-1.262 
(198.412) 
-0.345 
(2.296) 
0.030 
(0.618) 
-0.265 
(12.458) 
-0.074 
(0.911) 
1.140 
(26.935) 
-0.053 
(0.069) 
P1securn -0.948 
(139.498) 
-0.353 
(2.004) 
-0.005 
(0.142) 
-0.052 
(2.461) 
-0.010 
(0.103) 
-0.724 
(11.452) 
0.172 
(0.329) 
P1Mexp -0.547 
(69.138) 
-- 0.044 
(0.606) 
-0.530 
(16.034) 
0.074 
(0.620) 
-- -- 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Square 0.3853 0.0098 0.1887 0.1067 0.2949 0.1267 0.0133 
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Overall, our results show a crowd-in effect of government grants on fundraising 
expenditures and a crowd-out effect of government grants on private contributions. These 
contradict conclusions by Andreoni and Payne (2003), who argue that government grants 
crowd out fundraising efforts rather than private contributions, that this effect is large, 
and that it may explain the crowd-out observed in the literature. We infer from our results 
that fundraisers of these organizations do not reduce their fundraising efforts in the 
presence of government grants. By reducing their contributions when INGOs receive 
government grants, we conclude that donors possibly do not regard government grant 
recipients as especially meritorious or efficient. This agrees with positions taken by 
classical economists (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Bernheim 1986; Roberts 
1984, 1987; Warr 1982; 1983), who concluded from theoretical analysis that voluntary 
contributions to nonprofits may be completely crowded out by government contributions 
to nonprofits. On the other hand, matching requirements accompanying grants seem not 
to reduce the effective price of giving in the eyes of private contributors and may be a 
reason for the crowd out of private contributors by government grants noted in our 
estimates.63   
Comparing our results with the literature on crowd out theory, we note that our  
results are differ from those of Okten and Weisbrod (2000). They concluded that 
government grants generally do not crowd out private donations and that there are 
significant positive effects of the grants on private donations. Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) 
also arrive at similar conclusions, using a panel of 125 international relief and 
development organizations in the United States. They find that private donations at most 
                                                 
63 Rose-Ackerman (1987) shows that even non-matching grants with no strings attached may free a 
manager of a nonprofit from compromising his/her ideology to satisfy a major donor resulting into similar 
effect. 
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decrease by 13 cents for every dollar increase in government funding. 
We note that fundraising expenses crowd in private contributions in Table 11 for 
the RE model. We can conclude therefore that our results are an indication that private 
donors to INGOs recognize that high levels of fundraising may translate into higher 
donations from others or that the donors are indifferent to fundraising expenses. A $1 
increase in fundraising expenses leads approximately to a $31 and $18 increase in private 
contributions in the RE and FE models, respectively. These results suggest that the more 
INGOs spend on fundraising, the more people donate to them. We differ with 
conclusions by Andreoni and Payne (2003) in our analysis. They argue that the 
incomplete crowding-out observed in most empirical and experimental literature is due to 
a change in the behavior of the organizations rather than a negative change in the 
behavior of private donors.  
Program service revenue is negatively correlated with private donations and 
significant in both the RE and FE model. A $10 increase in program service revenue 
leads to approximately $9 and $12 decrease in private contributions in the RE and FE 
models respectively. This indicates that increases in the program service revenue may be 
diminishing donations as the marginal utility of output falls. Our results also suggest that 
increases in program service revenue do not stimulate donations in so far as donors wish 
to reward an INGO’s self-help and disregarding it as a source of information about 
management’s motivation to pursue its social mission. In contrast, we see a positive 
correlation between program service expenses and private donations, with a $100 
increase in program service expenses leading to approximately a $94 and $57 increase in 
private contributions in the RE and FE models, respectively.  
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Our conclusions agree with Kingma, (1995), who studies Red Cross commercial 
activities and found that profits generated from program service activities crowd out 
donations. (Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler 1995) and Khanna and Sandler (1997) also find 
some evidence of positive effects of program service revenue on private donations. Okten 
and Weisbrod (2000), on the other hand, find no evidence that private donations are 
affected negatively by “autonomous income”. 
The effect of the price of giving is economically very small and insignificant, 
although it has the expected negative sign on both models.  
The most important conclusion we draw here is that government grants crowd out 
private donations of INGOs as a group. This is in line with the predominant prevailing 
evidence in the crowd-out theory for most national charities, which suggests that the 
relationship between government grants and private donations should be negative.64 We 
deduce from our results that government grants do not signify an INGO’s worthiness for 
support by U.S. citizens. Our results are the opposite of much research (Khanna and 
Sandler 2000; Payne 2001), which concentrates on local American based nonprofits and  
which also uses a 2SLS specification to control for possible endogeneity of government 
grants.  Other studies that disagree with our conclusions on crowding-in results include 
(Connolly 1997; Eckel, Grossman, and Johnston 2005; Hughes and Luksetich 1999; 
Schiff 1985). This research further agrees with the findings of Horne et al. (2005), who 
conclude that the assumption that individuals possess knowledge of government funding 
levels and act on that knowledge is not true and has very little support among private 
donors. Based on our results, we conclude that most private donors to INGOs generally 
                                                 
64 Government grants are supposed to crowd out private donations. My results indicate that there is 
crowding-in rather than crowding-out. 
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do not view government grants to these institutions as a signal that the institutions are 
“okay to donate to” although they might not have the means to find out for themselves 
among the various INGOs soliciting for their contributions.  
Overall, our estimation results suggest that altruism toward others may not be a 
major motivator for giving in the U.S. If this were the case, we would expect to see the 
free-riding theory predominating, with donations made to maximize a utility function that 
includes the benefits to others or to the global society in general. Since we do not see this, 
we assume either that people may be getting utility (“warm-glow”) from the act of giving 
to INGOs or that the economic discipline of self-interested behavior is not suited to 
explain philanthropy to these organizations. We can infer that private donors to INGOs in 
the U.S. experience some form of direct private utility from the act of giving in addition 
to caring about the total supply of charity. Our research can be used to point out the 
inability of the U.S. government to influence foreign policy through an increase in the 
supply of foreign aid internationally through these organizations. INGOs as a group walk 
a thin line in depending on both private contributions and government grants so as to 
widen their resource base. The cost attributed to taxation seems not to be outweighed by 
the benefits of increased revenue to these institutions suggested with our results. We can 
conclude that there are fewer unique benefits that a private contributor to an INGO 
experience apart from the organization’s output. The strategic behavior of these 
organizations may also not account for the crowding-out observed in the literature.65 
The crowding-out literature states that the magnitude of crowding-out indicates 
the government’s ability to effectuate an increase in the supply of a public good. We 
                                                 
65 The benefits of giving to INGOs can be characterized as consisting of both private and public 
characteristics. 
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conclude that the government will not be encouraged to work more directly with these 
organizations when disbursing aid to countries outside its boundaries as grants to these 
institutions do negatively impact private donations, which comprise seventy percent of 
total revenues. Since aid to countries outside the U.S. is financed by tax dollars, we 
deduce that it is not Pareto improving for the country to rely partly on INGOs in the 
provision of public services worldwide through the disbursement of aid. Since the U.S. 
tax code subsidizes charitable giving, and the optimal subsidy rate on a charitable good 
depends positively on the magnitude of crowding-out (Andreoni 1990; Saez 2003), we 
conclude further that the optimal subsidy rate on charitable giving will be higher because 
of the crowd out from our regression. Since individuals seem to treat their own and 
government donations as perfect substitutes, the government will be less effective at 
increasing the supply of INGO services outside the boundaries of the U.S.A. 
Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006) conclude that despite low levels of administrative 
and fundraising expenses, the INGO sub sector operates on a slim cash margin with 
revenues just outpacing expenses.66 These institutions need to be looking for other 
sources of revenue. Our negative relationship between government grants and private 
contributions imply that the sub sector need not actively pursue government grants to 
shore up their revenues.67 As a source of revenue, government grants offer extra revenue 
to INGOs, helping to alleviate their bare-bones operations, which normally end in 
program cuts if the organizations fall on serious financial difficulties. Since private 
donations are the single most significant source of INGOs’ revenue (accounts for 70 
                                                 
66 Revenues and expenses were $17.7 billion and 17.2 billion respectively in 2003. 
 
67 It is possible that INGOs may keep their administrative and fundraising costs low to attract private 
contributions (Hager, Pollack, and Wing (2004). 
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percent of total revenue in the sector), it does not augus well that government grants68 
crowd out private contributions to INGOs. These institutions may jeopardize their main 
source of revenue when they receive government funding.69  
We conclude by stating that our research does not conclusively exhaust all INGOs 
in the U.S. as less than ten percent show that they receive government grants. As 
explained earlier, due to certain restrictions, some categories of INGOs are excluded from 
our data. It is also very difficult to answer the question of whether or not government 
funding preferences and program requirements are shaping the work of INGOs based on 
our regression results. 
 
Analysis of Sub-categories of the INGO Sub-sector 
 
When we subdivide the INGO sector into sub-categories, we note that there is a 
lot of variability among the sub categories. Since the model of crowd out depends on 
either government grants or private contributions being able to respond to the level of 
giving from each other, there may be an effect of timing that is not captured entirely in 
our sub categories. This might be one possible explanation for the variability. It is also 
possible that the effect of crowd out as well as the other control variables and instruments 
apply only to a subset of the INGOs hence the variance occurring across the sub 
categories. 
                                                 
68 Government grants account for approximately 20 percent of the sector’s revenue. 
 
69 The Hudson-Institute ( 2006) estimates that private giving is on average three and half times that of U.S. 
official government grants to INGOs. 
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The international foreign affairs and national security (ifans) sub-category makes 
up 11 percent of INGOs and accounts for less than 5 percent of the sector’s revenue. Our 
results from this sub-category are opposite to the results for all INGOs in the case of 
government grants’ effect on private contributions; the results are similar for government 
grants’ effect on fundraising expenses. Our fundraising expenses coefficient is significant 
for both the RE and the FE models, but the sign changes from negative on the RE model 
to positive on the FE model. This might possibly be caused by a great deal of skewness in 
the data for this sub-category (i.e. the effects of outlier organizations may swamp the 
effects of the majority). This problem possibly explain why the fundraising expenses 
coefficient (which is a main regressor) is significant in the RE model but its effect is in 
the unexpected direction. Our instruments may also be of low relevance, with the 
consequences of imprecise and potentially misleading parameter estimates. Our results 
agree with those of Duncan (1999) who finds a crowd-in effect, but do not agree with 
those of Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) who find a crowd-out of 13 cents for every dollar 
increase in government funding. It is clear that fundraising activities significantly crowd 
in private donations in the FE model but crowd out private contributions in the RE model. 
Our FE results support the views of (Driessen 1984; Straub 2004), who concluded that 
the “behavior of nonprofits” should be taken into account in the crowd-out theory.  
Since the category receives most of its revenue from private contributions (74 
percent) and less than 8 percent from government grants, these INGOs should accept 
government grants, as grants crowd in private contributions. On the other hand, they need 
to tone down their fund-raising activities70 to increase private donations in light of the 
fact that 47 percent of them have negative operating margins and few assets to fall back 
                                                 
70 Fundraising activities crowd in private donations. 
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on. 
The International Understanding (piu) category of INGOs makes up between 15-
17 percent of INGOs and 6-8 percent of the sector’s revenue. Funds from this category 
come mostly from program service revenue which has a negative relationship with 
private contributions in both models. Government grants, fundraising expenses, and price 
of donations change sign from the RE to the FE model. This is possibly due to outliers in 
our data set and gaps in the six-year sample period. We note that program service revenue 
diminishes private donations. This indicates that the marginal utility of output falls with 
the INGO’s own revenue-generating sales activities. 
 With 44 percent of these organizations having negative operating margins, there 
is a need for an increase in fundraising activities (especially since this category has the 
lowest fundraising expenses) to increase private contributions71 and enhance its financial 
health. This observation is based on the FE model, which shows a positive relationship 
between fundraising expenses and private contributions. 
The International Development (id) category has similar problems like the piu 
category, and hence the sub-category also faces similar problems that we have discussed 
above. The literature indicates that most of these organizations struggle financially with 
little operating cash from year to year, with 39 percent of them having a negative 
operating margin.72 Low asset levels provide little cushion during economic downturns, 
prompting these INGOs to explore and exploit other sources of revenue, especially 
                                                 
71 Private contributions account for 29 percent of this sector’s revenue. 
 
72 This category makes up 74 percent of organizations and 8 percent of the INGO sector’s revenue. Private 
contributions account for over 70 percent of the revenue while government grants account for an average of 
20 percent of the category’s revenue. 
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government grants for sustenance.73 Based on our results, an increase in fundraising, 
which has a positive relationship with private contributions in the RE model, would 
increase private donations and hence should be adopted. 
International Peace and Security (ips) and International Human Rights (ihr) 
categories make up less than 2 percent of INGOs and account for less than 4 percent of 
the sector’s revenue.  The government grants coefficient is insignificant in the ihr model 
but significant in the ips model and it also changes signs from the RE to the FE models in 
both the private contributions and government grants coefficients. This might be a sign of 
outliers and gaps occurring in both sub-categories.  
International Foreign Affairs and National Security N.E.C. category is related to 
the ifans category, but its major purpose is unclear. These organizations show that 
government grants crowd in private contributions in both the RE and FE models. The 
sub-category has similar results as the ifans category, and the analogy is also similar. 
Future research on the above categories should focus on the proportion of revenue 
from government grants74 among the many sub-categories delivering specific types of 
assistance in order to grasp fully the effect of government grants on private contributions 
in the major categories.
                                                 
73 Regression 1 suggests that government grants crowd in private contributions. This shows that 
government grants should be pursued by these INGOs as an alternate source of revenue so as to alleviate 
their precarious financial positions. 
 
74 Government grants vary considerably among sub-categories. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The effect of crowding out of private donations by government contributions, proposed 
by Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984), and extended by various authors, has had numerous 
empirical investigations.  Some studies have found significant evidence of partial crowd-out 
(Kingma 1989, Payne 1998). Others have found some evidence of crowding in of private 
donations (Khanna and Sandler 2000, Payne 2001). Most of these papers use relatively small 
sample of charities, and test for crowding out only in one direction. 
We extend the crowd-out literature to INGOs and seek to simultaneously investigate how 
government grants, private contributions, and fundraising expenses of INGOs in six sub-
categories affect each other. Using a U.S. panel data set of IRS Form 990 returns for the period 
1998-2003, we find that fund raising expenses have a positive effect on private donations. 
Government grants have a negative effect on fundraising expenditures and a positive effect on 
private donations to INGOs. We infer from this that an increase in INGOs receipt of government 
grants may provide favorable information to potential donors about the reputation or the 
trustworthiness of an INGO. 
Overall for all organizations, our results show evidence that government grants have a 
negative impact on private contributions to INGOs, although the size of the crowd-out is 
definitely sensitive to both the construction of the panel and estimating technique. It is also clear 
that government grants have a negative impact on fundraising expenditures of these institutions. 
Our findings of crowd out do not contradict other authors (Dokko 2005; Kingma 1989), who find 
a significant crowding-out effect of government grants on private contributions.
  
90
Under conditions of crowd-out, INGOs must examine the negative effects of government 
grants and might be wiser not to pursue government funding, especially in cases where their 
objectives and/or policies are not in alignment with those of the government policies. Under 
conditions of minor crowd-in or zero crowd-out, INGOs would be well served to vigorously 
pursue government grants for the efficient distribution of public goods and/or services abroad, 
especially when government policy interests and objectives align to those of the specific 
categories. Under conditions of crowding-in, these organizations can take advantage of increased 
government contracting to them, especially in light of the fact that direct government-to-
government foreign assistance has been deemed a failure Forman and Stoddard (1996). Our 
results of government grants crowding in private contributions to INGO sub-categories suggest 
an opportunity for these institutions to diversify their resource base by accepting government 
grants, helping them alleviate their precarious financial positions. 
The fact that we find little evidence for a negative relationship between government 
grants and private contributions lends support to the prestige theory and warm-glow theory of 
charitable giving (Glazer and Konrad 1996; Harbaugh 1998a), although this is not to imply that 
other motives for giving, such as altruism are not important. Our results refute the explanations 
given by the rational ignorance of citizens’ theory Downs (1957) and the fiscal illusion theory 
that assumes that government officials can mislead citizens on the taxation and spending 
activities of government. Contrary to assumptions made by Congleton (2001), that citizens are 
rationally ignorant because the time cost of citizens learning about the taxing and spending 
activities of government is too great, our results point out what appears to be a positive 
relationship between government grants and private donations. If people are rationally ignorant 
about the size and activities of government, regardless of whether government officials attempt 
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to hide their activities, we would expect there to be no statistical relationship between 
government grants and charitable contributions.  
Generally we conclude that crowd-out effect can be explained away by the fundraising 
activities of INGOs in the presence of government grants. As we find no evidence of a one-to-
one crowd-out of government grants and private contributions, we conclude that the early models 
in the crowd-out theory literature do not apply to INGOs. These models predicted dollar-for-
dollar crowd-out with suggestions that the models of “impure altruism” (which predict less than 
dollar-for-dollar crowd-out) are a more appropriate fit in the study of crowd-out theory. Our 
results seem to suggest new empirical evidence that government grants reduce fundraising 
activities rather than crowding out private contributions to INGOs. 
Finally, our results provide a rationale for coming up with policies to counteract the 
impact of government grants in crowding out fundraising activities such as matching grants (here 
a recipient of a government grant might be required to show increased fundraising revenue to 
qualify for additional funds). Our study shows how government grants affect fundraising efforts 
and this forms a basis for coming up with better policies toward international nonprofits and to 
offer a deeper understanding of the costs and consequences of fundraising activities which might 
be a valuable source of information to scholars and policy makers. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
Our hypothesis that government grants crowd in private donations can be broadly 
accepted, based on results obtained in most of our regressions. Our results show that even where 
government grants have a negative effect on private donations, the effect is small with the net 
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effect of government grants being clearly positive for almost all the sub-categories and for the 
INGO sub-sector. 
Understanding the relationships among the suppliers and demanders of charity is 
essential for calculating the social costs and benefits of INGOs, especially with the current trend 
of donor governments increasingly channeling aid to developing countries through private 
organizations like INGOs. We also know that these institutions are increasingly becoming 
sophisticated at raising money and delivering needed services, and hence they form a more 
reliable conduit of foreign aid from the government.  
The government might choose an optimal level of provision of a public good through aid 
to INGOs and adjust its funding to reach that level. Without accounting for the response of 
private donors, there is likelihood that funding will fall short of the optimal level due to 
crowding-out.  
The failure of government-to-government aid as noted in the literature and the efficient 
way the media has highlighted the plight of people far away from the United States, justifies 
more funding (public and private) to flow towards international nonprofits to try and rectify 
some of these problems. It is crucial to understand how each type of funding affects the other 
type if one aims to attain efficiency in making an impact on world problems. Our dissertation is a 
first step in the right direction. 
 
Future Research 
 
Our dataset faces the same weakness faced by most empirical studies of donations, as we 
focus on the crowding-out effect using data on donations aggregated at the national level, thus 
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yielding only indirect evidence on individual preferences (Khanna and Sandler 2000; Posnett and 
Sandler 1989; Weisbrod and Domiguez 1986). Future research should factor in the underlying 
motives of donations by analyzing the correlation between donations and consumption to fully 
understand the motives for donations. This will more precisely measure the crowding-out of 
private donations by government grants. This is important not only for charities designing 
fundraising campaigns, but also for policy makers who decide on public subsidies to charity 
donors or who make policy concerning the tax treatment of donations. This entails having data 
on donations at an individual level with the focus mainly being on the underlying motives of 
donation by analyzing the correlation between donations and consumption. 
Our results clearly show that all the sub-categories and the INGO sector respond in a 
similar manner to government grants. Future research should focus first on asymmetric 
information between private givers and charitable organizations about the quality of the charity, 
especially since private donors might see government grants as a signal that the organization is 
serious, causing an increase in private donations to that specific organization. First, reputational 
effects for certain types of charities, especially in terms of their age should be considered. 
Second, the restrictions facing different categories of INGOs in accepting government grants 
might differ, so future research with better data could contribute greatly to our understanding of 
the organizations’ behavioral response to government grants. 
Using data in future research that can distinguish between matching and non-matching 
grants can also help explain differences in how government grants affect fundraising behavior to 
different categories of INGOs. Our data, unfortunately, do not differentiate the extent of 
matching grants with government grants given to these organizations. Matching grants force 
these institutions to raise funds from private sources to qualify for the government grants, and 
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this might reduce the negative impact that government grants have on fundraising expenditures, 
enhancing crowding-in of private donations. The issue of matching grants also might explain 
why different categories of INGOs react differently to government grants. 
Aggregating INGOs further to individual subcategories instead of to 6 major sub-
categories might further be able to effectively compare how government grants affect private 
contributions to these institutions. Due to lack of enough data for my data set, we could only 
manage to aggregate INGOs into 6 major categories resulting in getting an average crowding-out 
and/or -in effect of the individual INGOs lumped together in a category. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Overview of the International Nonprofit sub-sector 
 
Number of Organizations in Major Groupings per Year 
International Understanding 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
General 72 85 86 92 98 111 
International Cultural Exchange 175 192 207 198 199 196 
International Academic Exchange 145 154 156 150 137 146 
Other International Exchange 59 59 60 57 53 50 
Internat. Understand. Subtotal 451 490 409 497 487 503 
 
International Development  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
General 335 368 376 396 395 448 
Agricultural Development 24 30 25 24 25 26 
Economic Development 30 32 26 30 30 32 
International Relief 187 229 226 239 269 317 
Human Rights, Migration and 
Refugees 
82 82 85 91 97 97 
Internat. Development Subtotal 658 741 738 780 816 920 
 
International Affairs  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
General 66 77 78 74 81 82 
Peace and Arms control 44 43 42 40 41 41 
International Affairs Education 15 16 20 18 18 18 
National Security 16 19 18 20 21 19 
Internat. Affairs Subtotal 141 155 158 152 161 160 
 
Total International Nonprofits 1250 1386 1305 1429 1464 1583 
        
Source: Kerlin and Reid (2004). 
 
  
96
Table A2: Number of INGOs with Registration Rule Dates in Specified Time Periods 
 
 No Rule date Before 1940 1940-59 1960-1979 1980-1999 2000-2001
International Understanding 72 5 31 126 511 53 
International Development and Assistance 298 7 86 336 2145 425 
International Affairs, Foreign Policy and 
Security 
45 4 25 92 336 32 
International Sub-sector Total 415 16 142 554 2992 510 
Source: Adopted from Reid and Kerlin (2004). 
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Table A3: Sources of Revenue by Percentage of Total Revenue (3 Sectors and Sub-sectors) 
Years    Percentages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector Sub-sector N Private 
Contributions 
Government 
Grants 
Program 
Services 
Other 
Revenue 
 
 
 
 
 
General 372 66 25 4  
Agriculture 32 22 40 31  
Economic 88 28 41 7  
International Relief 413 90 7 1  
Educational 180 58 17 12  
Health 274 71 15 11  
Science & Technology 19 48 24 14  
Democracy & Civil Society 42 38 46 10  
Environment, Population, Sustainability 95 60 14 12  
Human Rights, Migration, Refugees 92 77 13 5  
All International Development & Asst. Organizations 1607 71 16 6  
       
 
 
General 175 41 19 17  
International Cultural Exchange 37 44 9 16  
International Academic & Student Exchange 132 39 10 42  
International Exchanges N.E.C. 84 16 6 65  
All International Understanding Organizations 428 45 12 38  
       
 
 
 
 
General 182 50 7 9  
Peace & Arms Control 48 77 0 16  
International Affairs Education      
National Security 19 30 2 50  
International Economic & Trade Policy 38 49 35 8  
All International Affairs 308 70 5 10  
 All International Org.  2343 69 15 9  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 435 67 24 5  
Agriculture 33 19 38 31  
Economic 95 42 37 10  
International Relief 526 89 8 1  
Educational 205 55 19 12  
Health 316 68 16 11  
Science & Technology 20 44 30 10  
Democracy & Civil Society 43 23 64 8  
Environment, Population, Sustainability 110 57 15 12  
Human Rights, Migration, Refugees 104 69 18 4  
All International Development & Asst. Organizations 1656 71 17 6  
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General 179 42 22 18  
International Cultural Exchange 38 51 10 17  
International Academic & Student Exchange 128 43 10 39  
International Exchanges N.E.C. 82 19 8 63  
All International Understanding Organizations 427 39 13 36  
       
 
 
 
 
 
General 187 57 6 9  
Peace & Arms Control 50 83 7 17  
International Affairs Education      
National Security 19 28 2 51  
International Economic & Trade Policy 39 49 23 13  
All International Affairs 317 73 3 10  
 All International Org.  2400 68 15 8  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 534 67 24 4 5 
Agriculture 51 21 43 31 5 
Economic 145 34 41 13 12 
International Relief 754 88 10 1 1 
Educational 281 53 24 12 11 
Health 440 73 14 11 2 
Science & Technology 34 61 12 13 14 
Democracy & Civil Society 65 38 52 6 4 
Environment, Population, Sustainability 149 59 17 15 9 
Human Rights, Migration, Refugees 147 61 26 3 10 
All International Development & Asst. Organizations 2600 72 17 6 5 
       
 
 
General 240 56 16 18 10 
International Cultural Exchange 67 67 11 19 3 
International Academic & Student Exchange 201 12 35 45 7 
International Exchanges N.E.C. 118 31 11 53 5 
All International Understanding Organizations 626 33 24 35 9 
       
 
 
 
 
 
General 140 66 12 6 16 
Peace & Arms Control 130 70 16 7 7 
International Affairs Education 69 81 2 10 7 
National Security 30 36 3 37 24 
International Economic & Trade Policy 58 39 18 31 12 
All International Affairs 427 71 7 11 11 
 All International Org.  3653 67 18 9 5 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 585 69 24 4 3 
Agriculture 51 20 41 37 3 
Economic 149 37 43 14 6 
International Relief 812 88 10 1 1 
Educational 319 58 25 12 6 
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Health 487 69 18 11 2 
Science & Technology 36 72 14 8 7 
Democracy & Civil Society 72 24 59 14 3 
Environment, Population, Sustainability 157 65 14 19 3 
Human Rights, Migration, Refugees 162 65 27 3 5 
All International Development & Asst. Organizations 2830 73 18 7 2 
 
 
General 246 44 25 25 6 
International Cultural Exchange 80 71 11 21 4 
International Academic & Student Exchange 205 12 37 44 7 
International Exchanges N.E.C. 205 12 37 44 7 
All International Understanding Organizations 655 26 29 39 6 
       
 
 
 
 
General 148 67 12 6 16 
Peace & Arms Control 138 68 15 12 5 
International Affairs Education 72 78 6 10 6 
National Security 30 33 2 51 15 
International Economic & Trade Policy 61 41 20 31 9 
All International Affairs 449 70 9 12 9 
 All International Org.  3934 69 18 10 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 636 69 25 5 1 
Agriculture 56 16 39 42 4 
Economic 173 29 39 19 14 
International Relief 854 85 13 1 1 
Educational 351 51 30 12 7 
Health 528 70 20 8 3 
Science & Technology 39 64 10 23 4 
Democracy & Civil Society 79 31 54 12 4 
Environment, Population, Sustainability 174 56 21 21 3 
Human Rights, Migration, Refugees 171 71 24 1 3 
All International Development & Asst. Organizations 3061 71 20 6 2 
 
 
General 246 45 23 26 7 
International Cultural Exchange 84 72 8 12 12 
International Academic & Student Exchange 210 17 32 48 4 
International Exchanges N.E.C. 126 26 13 57 4 
All International Understanding Organizations 666 29 25 41 5 
 
 
 
 
General 144 76 12 7 6 
Peace & Arms Control 156 65 17 14 5 
International Affairs Education 76 83 3 9 5 
National Security 31 37 2 48 13 
International Economic & Trade Policy 65 37 23 29 10 
All International Affairs 472 74 8 13 6 
 All International Org.  4199 69 20 9 3 
Source: Kerlin and Reid (2000, 2003, and 2005); National Center for Charitable Organization/Guidestar National Nonprofit Database. 
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Table A4: Sample Description of INGOs 
 
NGO-Network Turnover or Related Monetary Figure in U.S. $ Operating in Number of Countries Other Size Indicators, information 
CARE (USA) From 2002 annual report: Revenues $428 million; 
Program Expenses $392 million 
Over 60 countries CARE U.S. is one of 11 member organizations with about 10,000 staff 
members 
International 
Cooperation for 
Development and 
Solidarity 
$951 million combined (Clark 2003) Four continents: Latin America, Africa, Asia-Pacific, 
and Southeast Asia 
Association of 14 catholic development and relief NGOs 
International 
Federation of Red 
Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies 
From 2000 annual report: Income $335 million; 
Expenditure $337 million 
178 115 million Volunteers 
Medecins sans 
Frontieres 
$304 million (Clark 2003) 80 Volunteer centers in 18 countries with thousands of members 
Oxfam International From 2001 Annual Report: $349 million in 
revenues, $303 in expenditure 
117 In 2000, worked with 3000 local organizations in over 100 countries; in 
2000 their “face-to-Face” campaign recruited 70,000 volunteers in 5 
countries 
Plan International From 2001 annual report: $303 million in 
revenue; and $301 in expenditures 
45 6,700 staff members; supports 1.3 million children in 45 countries; Over 
930,000 sponsors or members, 60,000 volunteers. 
Save the Children 
(USA) 
From 2002 annual report: $202 million in revenue 
and support; with about $200 million in 
expenditure 
45 85,000 sponsors in 2002 supporting more than 500,000 children 
World Vision From 2002 annual report: raised $732 in 
contributions, total of $1.032 billion if non-
monetary contributions included; expenditures 
$1.032 billion for Programs and also non-
monetary aid 
96 18,000 staff members in 2002 
World Wildlife Fund 
(USA) 
$350 million (Clark 2003) 50 5 million members worldwide. 
Source: (Anheir 2005; Clark 2003), based on Annual Reports from agencies listed above 
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Table A5: U.S. International Nonprofit Sub-sector Coding and Definitions 
 
Sector Sub-sector Code Total Number Definition/Primary Purpose Examples 
   
 
Q 
 Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to 
provide services or other forms of support to increase mutual 
understanding across countries, encourage social, economic or 
political development outside of the U.S., and/or impact 
national, multilateral or international policies on international 
issues. 
 
 
 
Alliances & Advocacy 
 
 
Q01 
 
 
65 
Organizations whose primary purpose is influencing public 
policy within the International, Foreign Affairs, and National 
Security major group area. Includes groups employing  activities 
designed to influence government and international institutional 
policy, such as, public education and influencing public opinion, 
public mobilizations, and lobbying. 
 
Religious Zionists 
of America 
 
Management & Technical 
Assistance 
 
Q02 
 
78 
Organizations whose primary purpose is consultation, training, 
and other forms of management and administrative support 
services to nonprofit groups within the International, Foreign 
Affairs, and National Security major group area. 
 
 
Professional Societies & 
Associations 
 
Q03 
 
93 
Learned societies, professional councils, and other organizations 
that bring together individuals or organizations with a common 
professional or vocational interest within the International, 
Foreign Affairs, and National Security major group area. 
 
Doctors for Global 
Health 
 
Research Institutes & Public 
Policy Analysis  
 
Q05 
 
432 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to conduct research 
and/or public policy analysis within the International, Foreign 
Affairs, and National Security major group area. 
 
 
Single Organization Support 
 
Q11 
 
200 
Organizations existing as a fund-raising entity for a single 
institution within the International, Foreign Affairs & National 
Security major group area. 
 
United Israel 
Appeal 
 
Support N.E.C.   
 
Q19 
 
328 
Organizations that provide all forms of support except for 
financial assistance or fund raising for other organizations 
within the International, Foreign Affairs and National Security 
major group area. 
 
 
 
Promotion of International 
Understanding  
  
 
 
Q20 
 
 
 
544 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to promote 
international understanding through activities, such as events, 
forums, trainings, and exchanges, which enable people to 
develop an appreciation for other societies, their traditions and 
culture. Use this code for organizations that provide a wide 
variety of organizations relating to the promotion of 
international understanding or which offer specific programs not 
specified below.  
 
 
 
Sister Cities 
 
  
 
International Cultural Exchange  
 
 
Q21 
 
 
1167 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide international 
cultural educational experiences abroad and/or sponsor 
international cultural events (e.g., touring performing arts 
troupes) that are designed to increase understanding of other 
societies through the arts and humanities." Also use this code for 
financial support for museums and other cultural institutions 
 
 
Japan America 
Societies 
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outside of the United States. 
  
International Academic 
Exchange  
 
Q22 
 
888 
Organizations that provide opportunities for high school 
students from foreign countries to live with an approved family 
in the United States and attend an American high school for one 
semester or one year in exchange for American students living 
and attending school in their country during the same period of 
time. 
 
Rotary Youth 
Exchanges 
  
International Exchange N.E.C.   
 
Q23 
 
338 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide international 
living experiences for individuals and families by arranging job 
exchanges, residence exchanges and other similar opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
International Development   
  
 
 
Q30 
 
 
 
2319 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide technical 
assistance training and material resources to support the 
capacity-building efforts of nations outside the U. S. with a 
focus on agricultural and rural development, health, education, 
social welfare, small business development and industrial 
growth. Use this code for organizations that provide a wide 
range of international development and/or relief services or 
those not specified below. 
 
Care Int. Book 
Proj; Peruvian 
Foundation for 
Educ. & Health 
  
International Agricultural 
Development  
 
Q31 
 
154 
Organizations that provide information, technical assistance and 
support to developing countries regarding the planting, 
nurturing, protection and utilization of agricultural products with 
the objective of increasing the productivity of their cultivated 
land and improving their food supply.  
Agric Services 
Inter. & Inter. 
Fertilizer Dev. 
Center 
  
 
International Economic 
Development  
 
 
Q32 
 
 
180 
Organizations that provide technical assistance and training, 
loans and loan guarantees and other forms of support to 
stimulate the economy, expand employment opportunities, 
encourage the establishment and growth of commerce and 
industry and otherwise enhance the economic development of 
countries outside the United States. 
 
  
 
 
International Relief   
 
 
 
Q33 
 
 
 
1467 
 
Organizations that work to relieve poverty in developing 
countries by providing funds, technical assistance and supplies 
which improve the health, education, welfare, social well-being 
and self-reliance of individuals and families. Also included are 
organizations that provide relief services in response to a major 
disaster or large-scale emergency that occurs abroad. 
 
Care Inter. & 
Hunger, Relief and 
Dev., Inc 
 
International Peace & Security   
  
Q40 
 
458 
Organizations that promote harmony and understanding among 
nations either globally or in a particular region of the world 
and/or engage in activities that promotes peaceful ways of 
managing and settling international conflicts. 
 
  
Arms Control & Peace  
 
Q41 
 
251 
Organizations that promote control of nuclear, biological, 
chemical and conventional weapons development and 
proliferation. 
 
Physicians for 
Social Resp. 
 
 
 
 
 
United Nations Associations   
 
Q42 
 
105 
Organizations whose activities relate specifically to the United 
Nations. 
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National Security  
 
 
Q43 
 
 
114 
 
 
Organizations that conduct studies on major national security 
topics including the U.S. armed forces, weapons decisions, 
deployment policies and the security aspects of U.S. foreign 
relations; monitor legislation on national security issues; 
advocate for specific defense policies and expenditures; and 
engage in other activities related to the security of the United 
States. 
 
 
National Security 
 
 
International Human Rights   
  
 
Q70 
 
 
358 
Organizations that work to protect individuals around the world 
from denial of civil rights and liberties or other arbitrary 
governmental interference, harassment, or abuse due to their 
political or religious beliefs. 
 
  
 
 
 
International Migration & 
Refugee Issues  
 
 
 
 
Q71 
 
 
 
 
176 
Organizations that monitor and inform the public about the 
world refugee situation; review refugee-related legislation; and 
advocate for specific policies relating to the plight of refugees in 
other countries. Also included are organizations that raise 
money to enable refugees to leave their own countries and 
migrate to foreign countries of their choice; or provide aid to 
refugees who have left their country of origin and are residing in 
another country outside the United States.  
 
 
International, Foreign Affairs & 
National Security N.E.C. 
  
Q99 
 
2839 
Use this code for organizations that clearly provide services 
related to international affairs where the major purpose is 
unclear enough that a more specific code cannot be accurately 
assigned. 
 
Source: Adopted from Kerlin and Reid (2003) and National Center for Charitable Statistics/Guidestar National Nonprofit Database. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1: Summary of Previous Empirical Studies and Findings 
 
Author, 
Objective 
Data and Methodology Model Findings 
Smith, T.M. 
(2007) 
The paper tests the 
crowding-out 
hypothesis for a 
balanced panel of 
nonprofit 
performing arts 
organizations 
 
Data: A balanced panel of nonprofit 
performing arts organizations from the 
unified database of Arts Organizations 
(1998-2003). NCCS-digitized data (1998-
2003). 
. 
eDisturbancRandom
ariatesrelevantotherofVectorX
venueServiceogramPSR
theforendituresgFundraFund
grantsGovernmentGovt
fundsdonatedguincompanyaofEfficiencyice
donationsivateD
Where
PSRbFundGovticeD ititITitititit
=
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cov
RePr
expsin
sinPr
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:
Pr 43211 Under alternative specifications, the relationship between 
government grants and private 
donations suggests crowding-in 
between $0.14 and $1.15 and 
changes according to art type. 
 
There is a lack of evidence of 
crowd-out for nonprofit performing 
arts organizations as a group. 
 
 
 
 
Kingma, B (1989) 
Examines the 
relationship 
between public 
and private 
funding with 
respect to 
nonprofit “public” 
radio 
  Public funding has a significant 
crowding-out effect on private 
donations in the range of $0.14(i.e., 
estimated crowd-out is merely 
13.5%) for public broadcasting. 
Brooks A. (2000b) 
 
  Finds a positive crowding-in 
between public funding and private 
funding to Symphony orchestras in 
the amount of approximately $2.50. 
Larger grants crowd-out private 
contributions though. 
Smith T.M. (2003) 
Looks specifically 
at the impact of 
National 
Endowment for 
the Arts funding to 
  Finds a modest crowding-in effect 
of approximately $3.0. 
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nonprofit dance 
companies 
Brooks, A. (2003)   Finds a positive and non-linear 
relationship between public and 
private funding in public radio. 
Andreoni J. and 
Payne A. (2003) 
They examine the 
relationship 
between 
government giving 
and fundraising 
for a panel of 
performing arts 
organizations 
NCCS data on nonprofit revenues and 
expenses for fiscal years 1982 to 1998 
(excluding 1984) 
 
measurespoliticalorandsindividualtotransfers
governmentcdemographieconomicofVector
measuresenditureorandrevenueofVectorO
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endituresgfundraioflevelrealTheF
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They find that government grants 
crowd-out fundraising 
expenditures. 
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Dokko, J. (2005) 
Examines the 
relationship 
between 
government 
giving, fundraising 
and private 
donations for a 
sample of 
nonprofit arts 
organizations. 
NCCS data for fiscal years 1990 through 
1998. 
endituresgFundraiF
periotimeoverddifferenceisiablethethatSignifies
iablescontrolofVectorZ
grantsstateandFederalGOV
donationsivateDON
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Finds that government grants 
crowd-out private giving by as 
much as $0.63. He also found that 
fundraising expenditures increased 
25 cents for every dollar decrease 
in government grants on average. 
Okten C. and 
Weisbrod B. 
(2000) 
They examine the 
relationship 
between public 
and private grants 
for a range of 
nonprofit 
organizations, 
including arts 
exhibits (galleries) 
Utilize a set of IRS data on individual 
nonprofit organizations in each of seven 
industries for the years 1982-1994 
 
dollarangcontributiofpricetheofnaturalTheiceIn
nonpaasexistedhasonorganizatitheyearsofnumberTheAge
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Find little evidence of crowd-out 
after controlling for fundraising 
expenditures. 
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Ribar and Wilhem 
(2002) 
Theoretically and 
empirically 
examines altruistic 
and joy-of-giving 
motivations 
underlying 
contributions to 
charitable 
activities 
Examine a 1986-1992 panel of donations 
and government funding from the United 
States to 125 international relief and 
development organizations 
termerrorspecificyearandonOrganizatiUnobserved
antseryingtimeobservedotherofVectorX
onorganizatiotherbyendituresServicelatedQ
SupportGovernmentDirectH
Where
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expRe
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,,.
 
Finds crowd-out to be close to zero 
(13 cents for every dollar increase 
in government funding) when the 
number of potential contributors is 
large, and expenditures on the 
public good are substantial in their 
study of contributions to 
international relief organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Straub (2004). 
Takes into account 
the possible effect 
of government 
grants on 
fundraising 
activities when 
estimating 
crowding-out for a 
set of public radio 
stations in the 
U.S.. 
 
 
 
The data covers a wider cross-section of 
stations (202 stations)and includes 
information on matching grants and 
fundraising expenditures. 
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Does not permit the rejection of the 
hypotheses that crowd-out is zero 
when he runs a regression on 
fundraising and crowd-out of 
charitable contributions to public 
radio. 
 
Abrams and 
Schmitz (1984) 
  Estimated crowding out to be 30 
cents on a dollar of state and local 
social welfare payments. 
Clotfelter (1985)   Estimates that crowd-out is only 5 
percent. 
Steinberg (1991)   The degree of crowd-out ranges 
from 0.5% to 35% per unit of 
government spending. 
Kingma and   Conclude that there is very limited 
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McClelland (1995) 
Examine data on 
giving to National 
Public Radio 
crowd-out. 
Posnett and 
Sandler (1989). 
Examine 
donations to U.K. 
charities in 1985. 
  Find that government grants to 
nonprofits increase (crowd-in) 
rather than decrease individual 
donations to the charity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khanna, Posnett, 
and Sandler 
(1995) 
Paper presents a 
set of panel data 
estimates for 159 
of the most 
prominent U.K. 
charities 
Examine U.K. charities for the period 1983 
to 1990. 
 Find that government grants 
encourage (crowd-in) rather than 
decrease private giving. 
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Payne (1998). 
Uses a panel 
dataset on 430 
U.S. charities 
between the years 
1982 and 1992 
Data comes from federal tax returns filed by 
IRS 501(c)(3) organizations for the period 
1982 to 1992 (excluding 1984) 
 
 
measureseconomicorandpoliticalofVectorz
grantsgovernmentalGov
donationsprivatealD
Where
GovD itjtijtijt
/
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Re
;
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=
=
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Concludes that government grants 
crowd-out private donations (i.e., a 
one dollar increase in government 
grants, on average, crowded-out 
private donations with about 50 
cents. 
Payne (2001). 
Uses panel data 
from U.S. 
universities 
 
  Finds evidence of crowd-in. 
Duncan (1999)   Cannot reject that there is complete 
crowd-out when including the joint 
effect on contributions of time and 
money. 
Andreoni (1993) 
Paper presents an 
experimental test 
of the proposition 
that government 
  Finds an average crowd-out of 
71.5% over all rounds of the game 
and finds crowd-out of 84% in the 
last period of the game. 
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contributions to 
public goods, 
funded by lump-
sum taxation, will 
completely crowd-
out voluntary 
contributions 
 
 
 
 
Chan, Kenneth, 
Rob Godby, Stuart 
Mestleman, and R. 
Andrew Muller 
(2002) 
  Shows that crowd-out increases as 
the involuntary transfer increases. 
Gronberg, 
Luccasen, and Van 
Huyck (2003) 
   
Bolton and katok 
(1998). Examine 
crowding out by 
comparing 
donations in two 
different dictator 
games 
  Find that 60% of the original 
transfers were crowded-out when 
the original allocation to the 
recipients was increased by $3 (i.e., 
they too find larger evidence of 
crowd-out in the lab). 
Eckel, Grossman, 
and Johnston 
(2003). 
Extends Bolton 
and Katok’s study 
to real charities. 
  Their results reveal great sensitivity 
to framing. In the neutral frame 
they observe essentially no crowd-
out and in the tax-frame they found 
complete crowd-out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breman A. (2005). 
Uses a new panel 
dataset to test 
Data covers all charitable organizations in 
Sweden between 1989 and 2003 (Total of 
361 organizations) 
 Find that the results diverge 
between the various types of 
charitable organizations and that 
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whether 
government grants 
crowd-out private 
donations to 
charitable 
organizations 
controlling for 
changes in the 
organizations’ 
fundraising 
behavior. 
 
2SLS specification 
the estimated crowd-out is small in 
social services organizations and 
health related organizations but 
significantly crowd-in private 
donations on average by 134% and 
52% to environment/culture and 
opinion/lobby organizations 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eckel, C.C., 
Grossman, P.J. 
and M.R. Johnston 
(2004). They 
implement an 
alternative 
experimental 
design with two 
different settings 
where the settings 
are identical 
except from the 
framing 
  They report almost complete 
crowding out when subjects are 
told that they are “taxed” with 
contributions to charitable 
organizations, but partial crowding 
out otherwise. 
Khanna, Jyoti and 
Sandler, Todd 
(2000) 
The paper 
examines the 
determinants of 
voluntary 
donations to U.K. 
charities, using 
empirical 
specifications that 
combine error-
component and 
simultaneous-
equations 
methods. 
Examine the determinants of voluntary 
contributions for U.K. charities during 
1983-1990 
AgeCharityofLogLAGE
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They find that fundraising is a 
positive and significant stimulant to 
voluntary donations and also 
evidence of crowding-in rather than 
crowding-out for the full sample. 
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Brown (1997). 
Extends the 
question of 
crowding out by 
looking at the 
charitable 
provision of 
private goods 
  He notes that if government 
spending on public goods can act as 
a signal to donors about the number 
of people in poverty, then it can 
lead to the possibility of crowding 
in, or an increase in private 
donations. 
Rose-Ackerman, 
Susan (1982) 
Paper shows how 
competition for 
donations can 
push fundraising 
shares to high 
levels even when 
donors dislike 
charities that 
spend a large 
portion of receipts 
on fundraising. 
`  Paper demonstrates that the 
competition for charitable dollars 
reduces the level of service 
provision relative to funds raised 
for all charities. 
Day, K.A. and 
Rose A. Devlin 
(1996) 
Paper addresses 
the question of 
what motivates 
people to 
volunteer, and if 
they respond to 
government 
expenditure 
decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
Uses the 1987 micro data set of Survey of 
volunteer activity. 
.
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Level of government spending 
influences the decision to volunteer 
but has no effect on the number of 
hours donated. 
Tefft, Nathan W. 
(2005) 
Paper shows 
evidence that the 
magnitude and 
frequency of 
volunteering and 
giving are 
significant. 
Summarized data on volunteering and 
giving collected by the panel study of 
income dynamics (PSID) in 2001 and 2003. 
 Confirms empirically previous 
results regarding income and 
substitution effects, price 
elasticities, and the substitutability 
of volunteering and giving. 
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Breman, Anna 
(2005) 
Paper uses a new 
panel dataset to 
test whether 
government grants 
crowd out private 
donations to 
charitable 
organizations 
controlling for 
changes in the 
organizations’ 
fundraising 
behavior 
Data covers all charitable organizations in 
Sweden between 1989 and 2003 
measuresenditureorandrevenueotherofVectorZ
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Finds estimated crowd out is small 
, close to zero or crowd in private 
donations, on average by 134% and 
52% after controlling for 
fundraising behavior 
Heutel, Garth 
(2006) 
The paper tests for 
crowding out in 
both directions in 
a static model. 
NCCS data from 1998-2003 containing 
1,388,480 observations 
 No crowding out effect can be 
found for any type of charity in 
either direction. Some evidence 
suggests crowding in of private 
donations by government grants for 
social service charities. 
Garrett, T.A. and 
Rhine, R.M. 
(2007) 
The paper exploits 
time series 
properties of 
charitable giving 
data to provide 
additional insights 
into the crowding 
out of charitable 
contributions in 
Annual data from Giving USA (2006) 
covering the period 1965 to 2003 
 Study found that increases in 
federal spending reduce total 
charitable giving by roughly 20 
percent. System estimation though 
finds no evidence of any effect of 
government spending on charitable 
contributions. 
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response to 
government 
spending. 
Richard Steinberg 
(1987) 
The paper presents 
unified models of 
the effect of 
exogenous 
governmental 
changes on 
aggregate 
donations and of 
the effect of 
federal changes on 
local government 
expenditures. 
   
Abrams, B.A. and 
Schitz, M.D. 
(1978) 
The paper 
concentrates on an 
analysis of a 
particular category 
of governmental 
expenditures-
social welfare 
transfers-and their 
effect on private 
charitable 
contributions 
Data is from federal welfare expenditures 
and charitable contributions for the years 
1950-1970 (1958 dollars) 
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The coefficients indicate that a 1 
percent increase in governmental 
transfers (per person) reduces an 
individual's private charitable 
giving by approximately 0.2 
percent. 
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Brooks, B.A. 
(2000) 
This paper 
presents a new 
macro-level 
dataset across 
several nonprofit 
sub-sectors and 
empirically tests 
the question. 
Dataset looks at both state/local and federal 
spending on social and human welfare, 
health, and education from 1955 to 1995. 
Federal spending on Arts and culture using 
data from 1966 to 1997. 
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The paper gets mixed results with 
crowding out being the dominant 
effect in social/human service 
provisions and health services. 
Literature is inconclusive in 
education and arts and culture. No 
case though of any significant 
evidence of crowding in was found. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Variable 
Initials in 
Raw Data 
Final 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Source 
Fund Raising Expenses p1frexp F_exp in 
millions of 
dollars 
Amount spent on soliciting 
contributions, gifts, and grants. 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Gross Domestic Product  
per Capita 
gdp Gdp1 in 
‘000s of 
dollars 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 
U.S.$) 
World Development Indicators 
CD-Rom (2005) 
Unemployment rate  Unemp Total unemployment as a 
percentage of total labor force 
World Development Indicators 
CD-Rom (2005) 
Population popn Popn1 in 
millions of 
millions 
Total population of the country World Development Indicators 
CD-Rom (2005) 
Population>65  Pop65 Population aged 65 and above 
as a percentage of the total 
population. 
World Development Indicators 
CD-Rom (2005) 
Government grants p1govgt g_grants in 
millions of 
dollars 
All government contributions to 
a charity organization 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Dues & Assessment p1dues Dues in 
millions of 
dollars 
Revenue received from 
“members” of the organization 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Program service 
Expenses. 
p1pexp Ps_exp in 
millions of 
dollars 
Expenses incurred by the 
organization in provision of 
services. 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
p1psrev Ps_rev in 
millions of 
dollars 
 National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Total Charitable 
Contributions 
p1cont P1cont in 
millions of 
dollars 
 National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Total Expenses p1totexp P1totexp in 
millions of 
dollars 
 National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Administrative Costs p1mexp P1mexp in 
millions of 
dollars 
 National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Returns on Financial 
Assets 
p1secrn P1securn in 
millions of 
dollars 
 National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Federal level transfer 
payments to persons 
trpyts Trpyts in 
billions of 
dollars 
 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(NIPA Tables) 
Federal level transfers to 
all nonprofit 
tr_ngo Tr_ngo in 
billions of 
 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(NIPA Tables) 
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organizations. dollars 
Price of a dollar of 
charitable donations (1) 
price1 Price1  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(NIPA Tables) 
Price of a dollar of 
charitable donations (2) 
price2 Price2   
Age of the organ.  Age The number of years the 
organization has existed as a 
nonprofit entity. 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) 
Effect of Sept 11, 2001   Dummy=1 if =>year 2001 
otherwise = 0 
 
Regime   Dummy = 1 if Republican 
otherwise 0 (Refers to the Party 
the current President belongs 
to). 
 
Ifans   International Foreign Affairs & 
National security Organization 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) – National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities – 
core codes 
Piu   Promotion of International 
Understanding grouping 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) – National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities – 
core codes 
Id   International Development National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) – National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities – 
core codes 
Ips   International Peace and 
Security 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) – National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities – 
core codes 
IfansNEC   International Foreign Affairs & 
National Security NEC 
Organization. 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) – National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities – 
core codes 
Ihr   International Human Rights National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) – National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities – 
core codes 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Detailed Mathematics of the Theoretical Model 
FOC’s: 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Table E1: Data Patterns 
 
Frequency Percent   Cumulative Pattern 
1085 32.82 32.82 111111 
273 8.26 41.08 …..1 
211 6.38 47.46 0.11111 
192 5.81 53.27 ….11 
165 4.99 58.26 …111 
129 3.9 62.16 ..1111 
101 3.06 65.21 1….. 
89 2.69 67.91 11111 
74 2.24 70.15 ….1. 
74 2.24 72.38 .1…. 
70 2.12 74.5 ..1… 
61 1.85 76.35 1.1111 
61 1.85 78.19 11…. 
58 1.75 79.95 1111.1 
57 1.72 81.67 …1.. 
54 1.63 83.3 111… 
46 1.39 84.69 1111.. 
39 1.18 85.87 11.111 
36 1.09 86.96 111.11 
32 0.97 87.93 …11. 
29 0.88 88.81 ..111. 
27 0.82 89.62 …1.1 
27 0.82 90.44 .111.. 
26 0.79 91.23 .11… 
26 0.79 92.01 .1111. 
25 0.79 92.77 ..11.. 
21 0.64 93.41 .1.111 
18 0.54 93.95 .111.1 
15 0.45 94.4 ..1.11 
15 0.45 94.86 ..11.1 
11 0.33 95.19 .11.11 
10 0.3 95.49 1..111 
9 0.27 95.77 .1…1 
9 0.27 96.04 11.1.. 
8 0.24 96.28 1.1… 
7 0.21 96.49 1.11.1 
7 0.21 96.7 1.111. 
7 0.21 96.91 111..1 
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6 0.18 97.1 .1.11. 
6 0.18 97.28 .11..1 
6 0.18 97.46 .11.1. 
6 0.18 97.64 11..11 
6 0.18 97.82 11.1.1 
6 0.18 98 11.11. 
6 0.18 98.19 111.1. 
5 0.15 98.34 ..1..1 
5 0.15 98.49 .1.1.. 
5 0.15 98.64 1..1.. 
5 0.15 98.79 1.1..1 
5 0.15 98.94 1.1.11 
4 0.12 99.06 1…11 
4 0.12 99.18 1.11.. 
3 0.09 99.27 ..1.1. 
3 0.09 99.36 .1..11 
3 0.09 99.46 1….1 
3 0.09 99.55 1..1.1 
3 0.09 99.64 11…1 
3 0.09 99.73 11..1. 
2 0.06 99.79 .1..1. 
2 0.06 99.85 .1.1.1 
2 0.06 99.91 1…1. 
2 0.06 99.97 1..11. 
1 0.03 100 1.1.1. 
3306 100 xxxx xxxxx 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Detailed Definition of the Model Specifics 
 
Pdonjt denotes private donations to organization j at time t, Govjt denotes government 
grants received by organization j at time t, and Zjt is a vector of control variables and includes 
political and/or economic measures in the United States. The crowd-out parameter (in equation 
32) is measured by β1, the coefficient on government grants, and tells us the total effect of 
government grants on private contributions.75 εjt is a random variable. Fexpjt denotes fund-raising 
expenditures for organization j at time t. Di denotes unobserved heterogeneity at the organization 
level (i.e. organization specific time invariant unobserved effects). Dt denotes unobserved 
heterogeneity at the time level (i.e. time specific unobserved effects). The crowd-out and/or in 
parameter (in the equation 24) is measured by α1 the coefficient on government grants and tells 
us the total effect of government grants on fundraising expenditures.76 ηjt and λit are random 
variables. 
Use of economic conditions of the U.S. proxy a donor’s incomes and the needs of the 
country for the services provided by the firms studied. We expect private and public donations to 
rise as real income rises. The effect of the other measures will depend on the type of INGO. 
Economic and demographic measures incorporate such variables as per capita income, the 
                                                 
75 If β1 = -1, private contributions rise by a dollar for every dollar decrease in government grants. 
 
76 If α1 = -1, fundraising expenditures rise by a dollar for every dollar decrease in government grants. 
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unemployment rate, and the different measures of the country’s population.77 
Political measures cover the representation of the political parties in legislative positions 
at the federal level and the political party affiliation of the president. These measures proxy the 
sentiments of the voters in the country as liberal politicians (assumed to be the Democrats) are 
associated with higher provisions of social welfare programs abroad. We expect government 
grants and private donations to INGOs to be positively affected by increases in the representation 
by democratic politicians.78 
We add age to the private donations model (i.e., the number of years the organization has 
existed as a nonprofit entity) as it may affect donations in two ways: directly, as a source of 
information about organization reputation, and indirectly, by influencing the productivity of 
fundraising. We expect that older organizations benefit from a reputational effect, and that the 
effectiveness of a given level of fundraising depends on the stock of reputational goodwill. We 
include organization and year fixed effects as we have a panel data set. Organization fixed 
effects capture the time invariant heterogeneity in the organizations (i.e. reputation, age, type and 
method of operation). We also include the natural log of age (LAGE) to account for the 
diminishing marginal influence of age as a charity becomes older. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Variables for economic measures include real per capita income of individuals in the U.S., the country’s 
unemployment rate, the proportion of the population whose age is greater than 65 years, the proportion of the 
population whose age is between 5 and 17 years, and the country’s population. 
 
78 Variables for political measures include a dummy variable indicating if the President is affiliated with the 
Democratic Party, the number of Democratic U.S. senators, and the ratio of Democratic to total U.S. representatives. 
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Other Explanatory Variables 
 
A detailed description of the RHS variables used in the SEM estimation can be viewed in 
table 7 in the appendix. A summary description of some of the independent variables is given 
below. 
 
Government Grants 
 
Government grants include all government contributions that enable the recipient “to 
provide a service to, or maintain a facility for, the direct benefit of the public” IRS (2000). 
Additionally, few organizations in the dataset report foreign government funding. While 
commingling of foreign and U.S. government funding is small, the NCCS Guidestar data provide 
no basis for assessing the extent of foreign government revenue reported. Government grants are 
arguably the best candidate for demonstrating crowding-in theory for several reasons.  First, they 
may enhance the reputation of a charity in the view of donors Rose-Ackerman (1982; 1987). 
Second, they are usually accompanied by monitoring of the clients by government officials, thus 
limiting information asymmetries. In doing so, they increase a potential donor’s willingness to 
contribute.  Third, there may be a “buying-in” effect, in which donors can desire to give to larger 
charities rather than smaller ones Rose-Ackerman (1982; 1987). Fourth, if government grants 
have a matching component, then this can reduce price and stimulate private donations. Finally, 
government grants can circumvent the standard neutrality theorem result that is behind 
crowding-out, whenever the government finances the grant, in part, from taxes on non-
contributors. The converse of the five factors above will lead to government grants becoming the 
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best candidate for crowding-out. 
 
Private Contributions 
  
Direct and indirect revenues are combined to represent total private contributions. Direct 
contributions include: individual grants, bequests, and giving by corporations, estates, and 
foundations. Indirect contributions include any money the organizations receive from affiliated 
organizations and those received indirectly from the public through solicitation campaigns. The 
level of voluntary donations is dependent on other sources of funds since donors may give less 
(more) as a charity’s income rises if they view alternative sources as substitute (complement) 
funding. If the overall level of funding is the only thing that matters (perfect altruism), then 
funding sources substitute for one another. But whenever donors view a source of funding as 
enhancing the desire to contribute, then the source is complementary to donations. 
 
Fundraising Expenses 
 
Fundraising expenses include the amount spent on soliciting contributions, gifts, and 
grants.  Specifically this includes the cost of “a) publicizing and conducting fundraising 
campaigns; b) soliciting bequests and grants from foundations or other organizations, or 
government grants; c) participating in federated fundraising campaigns; d) preparing and 
distributing fundraising manuals, instructions, and other materials; and e) conducting special 
events that generate contributions….”79 Fundraising can have two opposing influences on 
voluntary contributions Khanna and Sandler (2000). It can stimulate giving by informing the 
                                                 
79 See IRS (2000). 
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public and soliciting contributions when it acts like advertising. However, by channeling some of 
the charity’s income away from its final output, increased fundraising increases the price of 
giving, which is anticipated to reduce contributions. 
 
Severity of U.S. Disasters 
 
Disasters that occur in the country such as the terrorist attack on the twin towers on 
September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, among others, usually sensitize policy makers 
and the public to disaster-caused suffering elsewhere and consequently increase the likelihood of 
providing assistance and more of it. This logic can be reversed since policy makers may be more 
sensitive to the monetary costs of U.S. domestic disasters and be less likely to grant foreign 
disaster assistance. Nonetheless, we hypothesize here that U.S. disasters will increase empathy 
for foreign disasters and therefore increase the likelihood and amounts of humanitarian aid 
overseas. We expect a negative relationship between calamities happening in the U.S. and 
fundraising activities of INGOs. The reasoning here is that people donate more to INGOs after 
disasters in the U.S. and the charities cut back on their fundraisers due to the flow of finances 
from other sources. 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Fixed effects capture time-invariant heterogeneity in the organizations that affect the 
collection of funding and the use of fund-raising expenditures. We have included the age and 
type of the organizations to control for organizational fixed effects. Age defines the number of 
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years the organization has existed as a nonprofit entity. This affects fundraising efforts in two 
ways: directly, as a source of information about the organization’s reputation and indirectly, by 
influencing the productivity of fundraising. Older organizations are expected to benefit from a 
reputational effect, and the effectiveness of a given level of fundraising depends on the stock of 
reputational goodwill. We hypothesize that there will be a negative relationship between the age 
of the charities and fundraising activities of these institutions. 
The year fixed effects such as per capita income, the unemployment rate, different 
measures of the population, and so on control for macro-level time-varying shocks that affect all 
of the organizations similarly. We expect an inverse relationship between unemployment rate 
and population above 65 years with fundraising expenses since when more people are 
unemployed (or retired), they contribute less to charitable organizations even with increased 
solicitation. On the other hand, we expect an increase in fundraising expenses when the total 
population increases, as more funds are needed to reach the increased population. 
 
Dues and Assessment 
 
In Andreoni and Payne’s (2003) paper, dues and assessment affect fundraising 
expenditures positively and are significant at the five percent level. We find similar results with 
the regression as “dues and assessment” in the OLS regression are not significant although they 
are significant in the fixed effects and random effects regressions. These represent the revenue 
received from “members” of the organization and help control for time-varying changes at the 
organizational level. We expect a negative relationship between fundraising activities and “dues 
and assessment” since the more the charities receive from their members, the less likely they are 
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to embark on vigorous fundraising activities as they would probably meet a large percentage of 
their financial obligations through contributions from members. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
First-Stage RE Estimates 
 
Table F1: RE, Dependent Variable – Private Contributions 
 
Deviations OPvertime (d) 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
P1securn -0.631 
(0.028)** 
-0.822 
(0.022)** 
0.117 
(0.038)** 
-0.285 
(0.126)* 
-0.055 
(0.033)+ 
3.323 
(0.451)** 
2.889 
(0.151)** 
P1mexp 0.002 
(0.098) 
0.308 
(0.153)* 
-0.497 
(0.202)* 
-0.342 
(0.141)* 
0.331 
(0.177)+ 
4.940 
(0.620)** 
1.060 
(0.151)** 
Trpyts -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(32.888) 
-0.001 
(0.001)* 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(25.953) 
Population 0.019 
(0.027) 
-0.000 
(0.032) 
0.010 
(0.107) 
-0.006 
(840.404) 
0.036 
(0.018)+ 
0.107 
(0.159) 
-0.000 
(663-178) 
Dues 0.526 
(0.774) 
-0.365 
(0.881) 
1.007 
(0.600)+ 
7.444 
(2.112)** 
0.475 
(0.625) 
-13.252 
(21.802) 
4.153 
(4.068) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
1.022 
(0.004)** 
1.065 
(0.004)** 
0.869 
(0.018)** 
1.04 
(0.005)** 
0.605 
(0.048)** 
0.758 
(0.015)** 
0.925 
(0.019)** 
Price1 -0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.029) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.061) 
-0.063 
(0.097) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.980 
(0.028)** 
-0.953 
(0.178)** 
-0.507 
(0.082)** 
-0.929 
(0.034)** 
-0.487 
(0.073)** 
-6.372 
(0.363)** 
-1.068 
(0.234)** 
Mean overtime (m) 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
P1securn -0.948 
(0.042)** 
-0.408 
(0.040)** 
-0.016 
(0.059) 
-0.537 
(0.244)* 
-0.226 
(0.062)** 
-2.706 
(0.976)** 
-1.059 
(0.290)** 
P1mexp 1.238 
(0.027)** 
0.414 
(0.081)** 
0.287 
(0.055)** 
0.300 
(0.041)** 
0.353 
(0.158)* 
3.112 
(0.218)** 
0.143 
(0.088) 
Trpyts 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(32.888) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(25.953) 
Population -0.034 
(0.028) 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
-0.014 
(0.106) 
-0.021 
(840.404) 
-0.040 
(0.019)* 
-0.127 
(0.165) 
-0.002 
(663.178) 
Dues -1.092 
(0.120)** 
-0.225 
(0.271) 
-0.349 
(0.069)** 
-0.200 
(1.894) 
-0.099 
(0.221) 
-4.222 
(15.321) 
-0.022 
(0.553) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.538 
(0.001)** 
0.230 
(0.002)** 
0.243 
(0.004)** 
0.128 
(0.002)** 
0.241 
(0.018)** 
0.939 
(0.011)** 
0.086 
(0.009)** 
Price1 0.001 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
0.220 
(0.524) 
-0.055 
(0.138) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.615 
(0.011)** 
-0.272 
(0.056)** 
-0.239 
(0.014)** 
-0.142 
(0.014)** 
-0.294 
(0.044)** 
-1.545 
(0.669)* 
-0.095 
(0.052)+ 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
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Table F2: RE, Dependent Variable - Fundraising Expenses 
 
Deviations Overtime (d) 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
P1securn -0.037 
(0.006)** 
-0.040 
(0.001)** 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.054) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.179 
(0.073)* 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
P1mexp 0.091 
(0.020)** 
0.033 
(0.008)** 
0.017 
(0.033) 
-0.118 
(0.061)+ 
0.028 
(0.016)+ 
0.483 
(0.101)** 
0.026 
(0.009)** 
Trpyts -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(14.148) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(1.522) 
Population 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.000 
(361.523) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.026) 
0.000 
(38.883) 
Dues 0.310 
(0.155)+ 
0.031 
(0.044) 
-0.135 
(0.099) 
0.770 
(0.908) 
-0.391 
(0.057)** 
-0.397 
(3.544) 
0.253 
(0.239) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.031 
(0.001)** 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
0.052 
(0.002)** 
0.016 
(0.004)** 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.001)** 
Price1 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.014 
(0.006)* 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.144) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.059) 
-0.029 
(0.014)* 
Mean overtime (m) 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
P1securn -0.004 
(0.009) 
0.185 
(0.002)** 
0.144 
(0.010)** 
-0.842 
(0.105)** 
-0.041 
(0.006)** 
-0.976 
(0.159)** 
0.055 
(0.017)** 
P1mexp 0.234 
(0.006)** 
0.045 
(0.004)** 
0.090 
(0.10)** 
0.526 
(0.018)** 
0.127 
(0.015)** 
0.777 
(0.035)** 
0.032 
(0.005)** 
Trpyts 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(14.148 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(1.521) 
Population -0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(361.523) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(38.883) 
Dues -0.158 
(0.024)** 
0.106 
(0.014)** 
-0.055 
(0.011)** 
6.995 
(0.815)** 
0.196 
(0.020)** 
-1.771 
(2.491) 
0.520 
(0.032)** 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.004 
(0.000)** 
0.004 
(0.000)** 
0.005 
(0.001)** 
0.015 
(0.001)** 
0.007 
(0.002)** 
-0.013 
(0.002)** 
0.002 
(0.001)** 
Price1 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.003)** 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.130 
(0.085) 
0.045 
(0.008)** 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.032 
(0.002)** 
-0.017 
(0.003)** 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.066 
(0.006)** 
-0.073 
(0.004) 
0.590 
(0.109)** 
-0.014 
(0.003)** 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
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Table F3: RE, Dependent Variable – Government Grants 
 
Deviations Overtime (d) 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
P1securn -0.042 
(0.030) 
0.025 
(0.011)* 
-0.005 
(-0.005) 
-0.382 
(0.293) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
1.024 
(0.367)** 
-0.045 
(0.095) 
P1mexp 2.145 
(0.107)** 
1.533 
(0.077)** 
0.070 
(0.472) 
1.298 
(0.327)** 
0.174 
(0.127) 
6.900 
(0.505)** 
1.510 
(0.096)** 
Trpyts 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(76.514) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(16.427) 
Population -0.024 
(0.029) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.169 
(0.249) 
-0.012 
(195.174) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.130) 
-0.001 
(419.771) 
Dues 3.619 
(0.847)** 
-0.859 
(0.446)+ 
0.164 
(1.401) 
18.661 
(4.923)** 
-0.111 
(0.447) 
-4.226 
(17.754) 
-0.830 
(2.575) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.182 
(0.004)** 
0.009 
(0.002)** 
0.672 
(0.425)** 
0.237 
(0.013)** 
0.121 
(0.034)** 
0.255 
(0.012)** 
0.232 
(0.012)** 
Price1 -0.000 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.054) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.049) 
0.016 
(0.061) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.624 
(0.031)** 
-0.030 
(0.090) 
-0.393 
(0.191)* 
-0.653 
(0.078)** 
-0.111 
(0.052)* 
-0.395 
(0.296) 
-0.687 
(0.148)** 
Mean overtime (m) 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
P1securn -0.262 
(0.046)** 
-0.594 
(0.020)** 
-0.520 
(0.139)** 
6.961 
(0.568)** 
-0.015 
(0.044) 
4.894 
(0.795)** 
-0.244 
(0.184) 
P1mexp 0.979 
(0.030)** 
1.932 
(0.041)** 
1.094 
(0.129)** 
2.393 
(0.095)** 
-0.464 
(0.113)** 
4.907 
(0.177)** 
2.193 
(0.056)** 
Trpyts -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(76.514) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(16.427) 
Population 0.021 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.161 
(0.246) 
0.007 
(1955.174) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.134) 
-0.002 
(419.771) 
Dues -0.951 
(0.132)** 
-0.817 
(0.137)** 
-1.161 
(0.162)** 
-27.502 
(4.407)** 
-0.669 
(0.158)** 
6.387 
(12.477) 
-1.896 
(0.350)** 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.018 
(0.001)** 
-0.007 
(0.001)** 
0.113 
(0.009)** 
0.044 
(0.004)** 
0.233 
(0.013)** 
0.226 
(0.009)** 
0.065 
(0.005)** 
Price1 -0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.063) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.602 
(0.427) 
-0.089 
(0.087) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.091 
(0.012) 
-0.057 
(0.028)* 
-0.210 
(0.032)** 
-0.219 
(0.031)** 
0.064 
(0.032)* 
-4.096 
(0.545)** 
-0.137 
(0.033)** 
Observations (K) 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
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First-Stage within Regression Results – FE 
 
Table F4: FE, Dependent Variable – Private Contributions 
 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Population 0.019 
(0.027) 
-0.000 
(0.036) 
0.031 
(0.029) 
-0.002 
(0.060) 
0.036 
(0.020)+ 
0.107 
(0.169) 
-0.015 
(0.041) 
Dues 0.526 
(0.792) 
-0.365 
(0.968) 
1.007 
(0.673) 
7.444 
(2.375)** 
0.475 
(0.692) 
-13.252 
(23.150) 
4.153 
(4.641) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
1.022 
(0.004)** 
1.065 
(0.005)** 
0.869 
(0.020)** 
1.043 
(0.006)** 
0.605 
(0.053)** 
0.758 
(0.016)** 
0.925 
(0.022)** 
Price1 -0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.032) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.064) 
-0.063 
(0.110) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.980 
(0.029) 
-0.953 
(0.195)** 
-0.507 
(0.092)** 
-0.929 
(0.038)** 
-0.487 
(0.081)** 
-6.373 
(0.386)** 
-1.068 
(0.267)** 
P1securn -0.631 
(0.028)** 
-0.822 
(0.024)** 
0.117 
(0.042)** 
-0.285 
(0.142)+ 
-0.055 
(0.036) 
3.323 
(0.478)** 
2.889 
(0.172)** 
P1mexp 0.002 
(0.100) 
0.308 
(0.168)+ 
-0.497 
(0.226)* 
-0.342 
(0.158)* 
0.331 
(0.196)+ 
4.940 
(0.658)** 
1.060 
(0.172)** 
Trpyts -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001)+ 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Constant -4.003) 0.654 
(8.686) 
-7.053 
(7.082) 
1.160 
(14.504) 
-8.458 
(4.855)+ 
-22.834 
(41.017) 
4.246 
(10.015) 
Observations 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Squared 0.9851 0.9842 0.9633 0.9874 0.7751 0.9776 0.7501 
F-Test 9129.32 4938.76 176.67 3719.77 15.42 290.48 214.79 
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Table F5: FE Dependent Variable – Fundraising Expenses 
 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Population 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.001)* 
0.002 
(0.001)+ 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Dues 0.310 
(0.144)* 
0.031 
(0.033) 
-0.135 
(0.030)** 
0.770 
(0.520) 
-0.391 
(0.053)** 
0.010 
(0.051) 
0.253 
(0.163) 
Program Service 
Expenses 
0.031 
(0.001)** 
0.001 
(0.000)** 
0.008 
(0.001)** 
0.052 
(0.001)** 
0.016 
(0.004)** 
-4.548 
(15.115) 
0.005 
(0.001)** 
Price1 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001)+ 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.276 
(0.008)** 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
-0.014 
(0.005)** 
0.012 
(0.007)+ 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.598 
(0.220)** 
-0.029 
(0.009)** 
P1securn -0.037 
(0.005)** 
-0.040 
(0.001)** 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.013 
(0.031) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.165 
(0.149) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
P1mexp 0.091 
(0.018)** 
0.033 
(0.006)** 
0.017 
(0.010)+ 
-0.118 
(0.035)** 
0.028 
(0.015)+ 
0.463 
(0.229)* 
0.026 
(0.006)** 
Trpyts -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
4.071 
(0.463)** 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant -1.670 
(1.211) 
-0.639 
(0.298) 
-0.587 
(0.313) 
-3.218 
(3.174) 
-0.080 
(0.374) 
-41.269 
(36.780) 
-0.035 
(0.351) 
Observations 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Squared 0.4594 0.0046 0.1165 0.4801 0.0094 0.2134 0.1205 
F-Test 287.57 244.38 12.60 180.25 7.84 224.77 10.38 
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Table F6: FE Dependent Variable – Government Grants 
 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Population -0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.028 
(0.064) 
-0.061 
(0.059) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
0.022 
(0.066) 
-0.031 
(0.017)+ 
Dues 3.619 
(0.783)** 
-0.859 
(0.355)* 
0.164 
(1.477) 
18.661 
(2.348)** 
-0.111 
(0.398) 
-4.226 
(9.020) 
-0.830 
(1.911) 
Program 
Service 
Expenses 
0.182 
(0.004)** 
0.009 
(0.002)** 
0.672 
(0.045)** 
0.237 
(0.006)** 
0.121 
(0.030)** 
0.255 
(0.006)** 
0.232 
(0.009)** 
Price1 -0.000 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.016 
(0.046) 
Program 
Service 
Revenues 
-0.623 
(0.028)** 
-0.030 
(0.072) 
-0.393 
(0.202)+ 
-0.653 
(0.037)** 
-0.111 
(0.047)* 
-0.395 
(0.150)** 
-0.687 
(0.110)** 
P1securn -0.042 
(0.028) 
0.025 
(0.009)** 
-0.005 
(0.093) 
-0.382 
(0.140)** 
0.008 
(0.021) 
1.024 
(0.186)** 
-0.047 
(0.071) 
P1mexp 2.145 
(0.099)** 
1.533 
(0.062)** 
0.070 
(0.497) 
1.298 
(0.156)** 
0.174 
(0.113) 
6.899 
(0.257)** 
1.510 
(0.071)** 
Trpyts 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Constant 5.370 
(6.579) 
4.330 
(3.183) 
5.489 
(15.559) 
14.598 
(14.336) 
2.395 
(2.794) 
-5.559 
(15.982) 
7.910 
(4.124) 
Observations 10792 3702 2170 3601 821 498 2461 
EIN (N) 2427 874 481 797 170 105 610 
R-Squared 0.4229 0.3162 0.2086 0.4266 0.3437 0.9191 0.5199 
F-Test 477.72 67.67 23.20 296.97 3.05 361.99 129.92 
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APPENDIX G 
 
RE and FE Estimates for Balanced Data 
Table G1: Balanced Data, Dependent Variable – Private Contributions 
 
Random Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent  
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Fundraising 
Expenses 
3.433 
(0.242)** 
-2.214 
(0.120)** 
4.348 
(0.524)** 
2.073 
(0.125)** 
8.591 
(1.754)** 
3.180 
(0.409)** 
1.925 
(1.028)+ 
Government -0.210 
(0.050)** 
0.335 
(0.039)** 
-0.060 
(0.052) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
1.273 
(0.291)** 
0.049 
(0.059) 
0.239 
(0.048)** 
Population 0.030 
(0.009)** 
0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.069 
(0.070) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
Dues -0.137 
(0.633) 
0.360 
(0.488) 
-0.732 
(0.103)** 
-4.687 
(3.351) 
-1.312 
(0.866) 
-10.066 
(27.071) 
-0.446 
(1.350) 
Program Service 
 Expenses 
0.962 
(0.008)** 
1.064 
(0.003)** 
1.016 
(0.011)** 
0.973 
(0.007)** 
0.314 
(0.135)* 
0.969 
(0.018)** 
0.973 
(0.014)** 
Price1 0.000 
(0.008) 
0.021 
(0.043) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.068 
(0.269) 
-0.067 
(0.094) 
-0.267 
90.883) 
-0.074 
(0.137) 
Program Service 
 Revenues 
-0.994 
(0.038)** 
-0.749 
(0.141)** 
-0.915 
(0.024)** 
-0.881 
(0.031)** 
-0.197 
(0.139) 
-4.091 
90.516)** 
-0.898 
(0.135)** 
Observations(K) 5472 1644 1110 1908 510 300 966 
EIN (N) 912 274 185 318 85 50 161 
R-Square 0.9784 0.9907 0.9770 0.9927 0.6171 0.9861 0.9671 
Fixed Effects Estimates 
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent  
Variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Fundraising 
Expenses 
18.435 
(3.652)** 
21.937 
(1.085)** 
61.975 
(186.178) 
3.831 
(5.016) 
34.079 
(46.839) 
-13.447 
(3.224)** 
-0.578 
(11.494) 
Government -0.682 
(0.242)** 
-2.927 
(0.418)** 
2.347 
(4.534) 
0.099 
(0.562) 
-0.819 
(4.081) 
1.119 
(0.312)** 
0.702 
(1.468) 
Population -0.028 
(0.036) 
-0.053 
(0.019)** 
-0.162 
(0.390) 
0.010 
(0.027) 
-0.024 
(0.036) 
0.177 
(0.098)+ 
0.004 
(0.038) 
Dues -5.180 
(5.504) 
-1.412 
(4.205) 
7.841 
(24.440) 
4.322 
(22.407) 
5.945 
(10.220) 
-4.189 
(69.443) 
2.878 
(5.790) 
Program Service 
 Expenses 
0.571 
(0.101)** 
1.074 
(0.010)** 
-1.168 
(4.306) 
0.819 
(0.388)* 
0.296 
(0.562) 
0.427 
(0.088)** 
0.845 
(0.213)** 
Price1 0.000 
(0.027) 
-0.038 
(0.061) 
-0.000 
(0.023) 
-0.078 
(0.313) 
-0.132 
(0.232) 
0.030 
(0.235) 
-0.098 
(0.149) 
Program Service  
Revenues 
-1.147 
(0.180)** 
0.428 
(0.501) 
-0.093 
(1.078) 
-0.814 
(0.432) 
-0.316 
(0.410) 
-7.594 
(0.753)** 
-1.524 
(1.801) 
Observations(K) 5472 1644 1110 1908 510 300 966 
EIN (N) 912 274 185 318 85 50 161 
R-Square 0.6750 0.8063 0.0014 0.9755 0.1719 0.7123 0.9051 
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Table G2: Balanced Data, Dependent Variable - Fundraising Expenses 
 
Random Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Private 
Contributions 
0.285 
(0.023)** 
0.304 
(0.104)** 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.363 
(0.033)** 
0.106 
(0.070) 
-0.092 
(0.017)** 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
Government 
Grants  
0.058 
(0.020)** 
-0.392 
(0.082)** 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.139 
(0.128) 
-0.252 
(0.021)** 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
Population 0.016 
(0.004)** 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.001)+ 
Dues 0.077 
(0.188) 
-0.730 
(0.471) 
-0.061 
(0.025)* 
4.612 
(1.330)** 
-0.007 
(0.163) 
-0.913 
(3.060) 
0.760 
(0.140)** 
Program Service 
Expenses 
-0.274 
(0.023)** 
-0.322 
(0.111)** 
0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.345 
(0.035)** 
-0.029 
(0.030) 
0.132 
(0.019)** 
0.009 
(0.024) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
0.279 
(0.027)** 
0.357 
(0.121)** 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.301 
(0.040)** 
0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.656 
(0.114)** 
-0.063 
(0.033)+ 
P1securn 0.168 
(0.019)** 
0.250 
(0.095)** 
0.018 
(0.005)** 
-0.065 
(0.083) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.348 
(0.117)** 
-0.021 
(0.012)+ 
P1Mexp 0.040 
(0.072) 
1.252 
(0.231)** 
0.106 
(0.018)** 
0.148 
(0.092) 
0.005 
(0.033) 
2.344 
(0.160)** 
0.164 
(0.030)** 
Observations (K) 5472 1644 1110 1908 510 300 966 
EIN (N) 912 274 185 318 85 50 161 
R-Square 0.6044 0.2029 0.2552 0.7382 0.1292 0.7244 0.2462 
Fixed Effects Estimates  
 INGO Sub-Categories 
Independent 
variables 
All INGOs Ifans Piu Id Ips Ihr IfansNEC 
Private 
Contributions 
0.040 
(7.235) 
-0.125 
(0.356) 
-0.025 
(0.705) 
1.044 
(11.972) 
-0.187 
(0.812) 
-0.076 
(0.884) 
-0.035 
(0.182) 
Government 
Grants  
0.085 
(20.02) 
-- -0.069 
(0.916) 
-0.406 
(5.200) 
-- 0.567 
(4.771) 
0.148 
(0.115) 
Population 0.001 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
-0.009 
(0.113) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.027 
(0.116) 
0.003 
(0.001)** 
Dues -- 0.458 
(1.102) 
-- -- -0.543 
(1.365) 
-- 0.483 
(0.643) 
Prog.ram Service 
Expenses 
-0.025 
(7.067) 
0.135 
(0.382) 
0.075 
(0.067) 
-0.944 
(11.308) 
0.118 
(0.463) 
-0.087 
(0.724) 
0.012 
(0.156) 
Program Service 
Revenues 
0.078 
(5.825) 
-0.815 
(0.268) 
-0.022 
(0.112) 
0.691 
(7.721) 
-0.080 
(0.327) 
-0.222 
(4.099) 
-0.204 
(0.261) 
P1securn -0.009 
(4.836) 
-0.151 
(0.322) 
0.004 
(0.083) 
0.009 
(0.327) 
-0.014 
(0.055) 
-0.631 
(3.556) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
P1Mexp -0.132 
(7.977) 
-0.075 
(0.539) 
-0.081 
(0.180) 
1.085 
(15.561) 
0.074 
(0.266) 
-3.135 
(29.745) 
-- 
Observations(K) 5472 1644 1110 1908 510 300 966 
EIN (N) 912 274 185 318 85 50 161 
R-Square 0.3415 0.0000 0.1126 0.6000 0.2338 0.2226 0.0053 
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